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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 28, 1945, the United states Senate expressed 
what appeared to be overwhelming support for, and confidence 
in the United Nations Charter by voting for its ratification 
1
eighty-nine to two. Today, aver a quarter of a century 
after the Senate's endorsement of the United Nations' goals 
and principles, that organization has become the object of 
intense criticism and disenchantment on the part of many 
Americans. Indeed, a strong skepticism regarding the use­
fulness and effectiveness of the United Nations apparently 
characterizes the feelings of a large portion of the world 
public today. It has therefore become meaningful to go back 
to the senatorial debate and ratification of the Charter and 
to evaluate the pro and con arguments made in that debate in 
terms of the SUbsequent history of the United Nations. For 
example, did the senators oversell the United Nations as a 
peace-keeping agency, or were their arguments perceptive and 
realistic in the light of history? Also, what, if any, were 
their reservations about the United Nations, and just how 
prescient were the few anti-UN senators about the problems 
the organization would face when actually established? And, 
2 
finally, what effect, if any, has the senatorial debate had 
on the expectations and development of the United Nations to 
date? 
I. THE PROBLET1 
The justification for a detailed analysis of the 
debate and final vote stems from a simple premise: that the 
debate was qUite significant in a symbolic sense. Specifi­
cally, the debate symbolized a historic turning-point in 
American foreign policy from isolationism to international­
ism. The world had just experienced its second devastating 
world war in less than three decades, and consequently the 
climate was most favorable for the creation of an inter­
national peace-keeping organization. In light of this fact, 
it was essential at the outset of this study to describe the 
various factors and historical events that eventually led to 
Senate consideration of the Charter. 
Next, after examining the events that preceded Senate 
debate on the Charter, the arguments of the senators for and 
against the Charter were carefully studied and analyzed. 
These arguments were, of course, examined in the context of 
world and domestic conditions eXisting at the time, With 
emphasis on public opinion regarding the United Nations 
prior to the debate as evidenced by public opinion polls and 
the news media. Whenever significant, remarks made by a 
-3 
senator out of the Senate Chamber were also examined as a 
means of detecting possible inconsistency or ambivalence. 
The various arguments were then classified and arranged in 
such a manner as to lend clarity and cohesion to the text. 
Emphasis was placed on those arguments and concerns deemed 
most important by the senators themselves or felt to be most 
relevant to this analysis by the author. 
Finally, the debate was correlated with the actual 
development of the United Nations. This means that an 
effort was made to ascertain the contribution and impact of 
the debate on the United Nations today and its possible 
effect on current American disillusionment about that organ­
ization. 
II. EVENTS LEADING TO SENATE CONSID~'iATION 
The concept of an international organization for 
keeping the peace was realized after World War I in the 
League of Nations. Although the League failed, partly 
because of the lack of United States participation and sup­
port, many of its characteristics were carried over to the 
United Nations Charter. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was 
keenly aware of America's predilection for isolationism, and 
he therefore began planning for a united nations organiza­
tion during early World War II in hopes of avoiding the fate 
suffered by former President Woodrow wilson when his pleas 
4
 
for joining the League were rejected by the Senate. 
The Charter was drawn up while World War II was still 
being waged, and it largely resulted from American planning 
and leadership. President Roosevelt met with Prime Minister 
Churchill on the deck of the ship "Augusta" on August 14, 
1941 to discuss ways of warding off German aggression. The 
decisions made at that rendezvous were promulgated as the 
"Atlantic Charter,lI in essence a statement of eight prin­
ciples for attaining world peace and democracy at the close 
lof the war. From this point on, the United States assumed a 
leadership role in preparing the world for a new postwar 
international peace organization. A series of planning con­
ferences followed the promulgation of the Atlantic Charter: 
the Declaration of United Nations in January of 1942; the 
Casablanca Conference in January of 194); the Food Confer­
ence at Hot Spri~~s in May of 194); and the Bretton Woods 
Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July of 1944. 2 
These early meetings emphasized the functional approach to 
peace, which assumes that it is easier to get a consensus on 
economic and social matters than on other things. 
On August 21, 1944, the Dumbarton oaks Conversations 
began 1n Washir~ton. Here the Allied Powers first discussed 
lSigrld Arne, 
Farrar and Rinehart, 
United Nations Primer 
Inc., 194)' ,- p. 6. 
(New York: 
2 Ibid . 
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the creation of an international organization and exchanged 
ideas about their role and voice in such an organization. l 
The major outlines for a world organization had now been set 
and in February. 1945. Churchill. Roosevelt. and Stalin met 
at Yalta to resolve the key issues left unsettled at Dumbar­
ton Oaks. Major issues at this conference included: a 
politically acceptable method of restoring a fragmented 
Europe; the text of voting arrangements in the Security 
Council; and the general question of voting. especially 
Russia's contention that her sixteen constituent republics 
2
should have sovereign voting rights in the United Nations. 
The groundwork for San Francisco had been laid. 
On April 25. 1945. fifty nations representing the 
anti-Axis coalition met in San Francisco to draw up the 
United Nations Charter.) The United states delegation con-
slated of Edward R. Stettinius. Jr •• secretary of State. 
head of the delegation. and president of the conference; 
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R •• Mich.); Senator Tom 
Connally (D •• Texas); Representative Sol Bloom (D •• N.Y.); 
Representative Charles A. Eaton (R •• N.J.); Navy Commander 
Harold Stassen; and Dean Virginia Gildersleeve of Barnard 
lInts L. Glaude. Jr •• Swords into Plowshares (New 
York: Random House, 1967). p. 53. ---­
lIbid.. 2 Ibid. 
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lCollege. On June 26, 1945, after only two months of delib­
eration, the Charter was unanimously approved by all fifty 
2 
attending nations. It was now ready to be referred to the 
prospective member states for ratification as required by 
their constitutional processes. 
It is well to note here that during the series of 
conferences which culminated at San Francisco it was obvious 
that President Roosevelt was taking every possible precau­
tion to avoid the mistake President Wilson had made in 
alienating the Senate. Roosevelt shrewdly relied on the 
advice of prominent members of both major political parties 
While constantly keeping Congress informed of new develop­
ments. He was especially careful not to exert pressure on 
members of the Senate, but instead to let prominent members 
of that body rally support among their colleagues. The 
United States delegates who attended San Francisco were 
carefully selected to emphasize the nonpolitical flavor of 
the venture, and it should be noted that four of the six 
delegates were members of Congress. Of these four, Connally 
and Bloom were Democrats, While Vandeberg and Eaton were 
Republicans. Thus, at the close of the Conference the dele­
gates' support for the Charter projected an image of blpar­
lcongressional Record, Part 5. 6877.
 
2Claude, ~. cit., p. 54.
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tisan support under congressional leadership and initiative. 
After Roosevelt's death in April of 1945 Truman 
carried on the same consensual tactics of his predecessor, 
while carefully avoiding any air of presumption. During the 
debate over ratification, this fact was succinctly aoknow­
1edged by Republican Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas, who 
said: 
That differenoe in procedure between the handling 
of the League Covenant 26 years ago and the United 
Nations Charter today might seem to some a small 
matter; but human nature being what it is under the 
Constitution and the American system of government-­
this difference in procedure of itself might spell 
the difference between success and failure in getting 
ratifioation. l 
The overwhelming success which the Charter enjoyed in 
the Senate can largely be attributed to the unobtrusive 
manner in which it was presented to that body by the Execu­
tlve Branch; however, early discussions and resolutions in 
the Senate Chamber also revealed a self-directed interest on 
the part of many senators to establish some sort of inter­
national organization for peace. On March 16, 1943, 
Senators Hatch (D, N.H.), Hill (D., Ala.), Ball (R., Mi~~.), 
and Burton (R., Ohio) introduced a resolution to form an 
organization of the United Nations. The resolution called 
specifically for authority to: (1) coordinate military and 
economic efforts among the Allied Nations to defeat the a~is 
1CODc'Sressional Hecord, .£E. cit., Part 6, 8087. 
~.- ._.. . 
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Powers; (2) administer Axis-controlled areas after the war; 
(3) offer relief and economio rehabilitation to member 
states and Axis-occupied areas after the war; (4) establish 
machinery and prooedure for peaoeful settlement of disputes 
between nations; and (5) provide and maintain a military 
Iforce to suppress agression by any nation. On October 4, 
1943, Senator Wilson (R., Ia.) proposed a resolution 
requesting President Roosevelt to invite the friendly 
nations of the world to a conference for the purpose of 
forming and joining an international peace organization. 2 
And on November 5, 1943, the Connally Resolution was passed 
in the Senate by a vote of eighty-five to five. This Reso­
lution, otherwise known as Senate Resolution 192, signalled 
the receptivity of the Senate towards the creation of an 
international peace organization. It provided 
That the Senate recognizes the necessity of there 
being established at the earliest practioable date 
a general international organization, based on the 
principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving 
states, and open to membership by all suoh states, 
large and small, for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.J 
The Connally Resolution also stated that any such agreement 
on the part of the United States Government should be made 
only upon the "advice and consent of the Senate of the 
lIbid., 8106-8107. 2Ibid ., 8189. 
J1b1d ., 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) LXXXLX, Part 7, 
9222. 
9 
United States, provided two-thirds of the senators present 
concur. III Of the five senators who voted against the Reso­
lution, four were also present for the vote on ratification 
of the Charter in 1945. These four were Republican Senators 
Johnson of California, Langer of North Dakota, and Shlpstead 
of Minnesota and Democratic Senator Wheeler of Montana. 2 
After the Charter had been sUbmitted to the Senate 
for ratification it was referred to the Foreign Relations 
Committee for open hearings that were held from July 9 to 
July 15, 1945. Senator Connally, Chairman of the Committee, 
later stated that no one was denied a hearing who Wished to 
be heard and that each witness had ample opportunity to 
fully express his or her views. The hearings moved in a 
rather routine manner with the majority of Witnesses being 
supporters of the Charter. Spokesmen for several organiza­
tions and interest groups testified in support or opposition 
to the Charter, and the witnesses varied widely in promi­
nence and background. The senate seemed to have relied 
heavily on the testimony of John Foster Dulles, who had been 
one of the chief advisers to the United States Delegation at 
San Francisco. By way of contrast, an individual by the 
name of David Darrin, who was opposed to the Charter, spoke 
on behalf of the "United Nations of Earth Association,!! of 
J
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which he was the solitary member. l 
On July 15, after only one week of hearings, the 
Charter passed the Committee by a vote of twenty to one and 
was submitted to the Senate as a whole for debate. It was 
labeled "Executive F" and read as follows: 
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present con­
curring) that the Senate advise and consent to the 
ratification of Executive F (79th Cong., 1st sess.) 
the Charter of the United Nations, with the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice annexed thereto, 
formulated at the United Nations Conference on Inter­
national Organization and signed at san Francisco on 
June 26, 1945. 2 
The Senate was now at last entrusted with the constitutional 
responsibility of examining and deliberating on the provi­
sions of the Charter as a prelude to the eventual vote on 
its ratification. Thus the stage was set for the ensuing 
debate, which will be fully analyzed in subsequent chapters 
of this study. 
As a concluding note to this Introduction, it should 
be stated that the Congressional Record was the chief pri­
mary source for the basic data and materials on which this 
study was based. Other important sources included contempo­
rary newspaper and magazine articles, Which were used as 
informational supplements to the Record. The secondary 
sources used in the study were books relating to the his­
lIbid., 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) IXC, Part 6,
 
7950-795S:-­
2 Ibld., 8168. 
... 
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torical development of the United Nations after 1945. 
CHAPrKH I I 
BASIC POINTS OF CONTROVERSY 
One of the primary functions of the debate over rati­
fication of the Charter was to enable the senators to dis­
cuss and clarify those provisions of the Charter that were 
subject to controversy. It should be noted that these 
specific points of controversy differed significantly from 
the broad ideological and philosophical arguments offered by 
the proponents and opponents of the United Nations as to why 
the creation of such an organization was desirable or unde­
sirable. Many such points of controversy dealt With minor 
provisions that were not Vitally important to the future 
operations of the United Nations; others. however. were 
vital to the substance of the Charter. and. depending upon 
the final interpretation of the Senate, would have a pro­
found impact on the future of the organization and the role 
f 
of the United States vis-~-viS the United Nations. The 
ultimate authority of the United Nations would to some 
extent be dependent upon the interpretations and conclusions 
attached to the various provisions of the Charter by the 
Senate. 
The Charter did not minutely prescribe the manner in 
which its various articles should be carried out by the 
member states. The authors of the Charter Wisely realized 
-
13 
that if the United Nations should survive. it must be flexi­
ble enough to allow for adaptability and orderly growth. In 
other words. if it was to have any hope of remaining viable, 
it would have to permit its member states to determine the 
manner in which they wished to enforce its directives. Any 
major encroachment on the sovereign wishes of a member 
state, especially one of the emerging super powers such as 
the United states or the Soviet Union, would ultimately lead 
to the destruction of the United Nations. And, not sur­
prisingly, the U.S. Senate reviewed and interpreted the 
Charter from the perspective of the United States national 
interest. 
That part of the debate Which focused on substantive 
and interpretive issues raised by the Charter often proved 
to be the most accurate index of the senators' true feelings 
about the United Nations, for during these portions of the 
dialogue many of the crucial reservations of the proponents 
were revealed. Several senators who felt it politically 
expedient to speak 1n idealistic platitudes about the United 
Nations manifested deep-seated ideological doubts about its 
purpose and practicability when questioning specific provi­
slons. Debate on such issues as the veto rule, the tnter­
national armed force, and the effect of the Charter on 
reglo~~l agreements constituted a significant gauge of the 
true sentiments of many of the senators. The overall impor­
l
I 
J
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tance of these points in controversy can scarcely be over­
emphasized, for they added a realistic dimension to what 
would otherwise have been a deceptively harmonious forum of 
assent and enthusiasm regarding the Charter. 
I. THE VETO RULE AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
One of the major concerns of the Senate was the 
nature and applicability of the veto by the "Big Five" per­
manent members of the Security Council--China, France, the 
Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United states. The 
veto power was inferred from ,Article 27 of the Charter, 
which states that on "procedural matters" seven of the 
eleven members of the Council will suffice to make a deci­
s1on, t<Jhile "all other matters" shall require seven affirma­
tive votes, including the unanimous consent of the Big Five. 
Thus, Article 27 enabled any of the Big Five to unilaterally 
defeat (l.e., veto) any measure that was not strictly pro­
cedural. 
A basic issue raised by the Senate was whether 
Chapter VI of the Charter always envisaged a privilege of 
great power veto. This Chapter, entitled "Pacific Settle­
ment of Disputes," contained several articles subject to 
contention. Article 37 stated that when parties were 
engaged in a dispute and were unable to solve their dispute 
by means of pacific settlement (i.e., negotiation, inquiry, 
J 
1 
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mediation, conciliation, arbitration, Judicial settlement, 
or regional arrangements as mentioned in Article 33) then 
the Security Council should recommend appropriate terms of 
settlement. Article 38 added that contending parties could, 
on their own volition, request a recommendation by the 
Security Council. The question then arose: At this point 
in a dispute must a permanent member of the Council who is 
also a party to a dispute abstain from voting or may such a 
party exercise a veto and thereby block any discussion on 
recommendation about the means of solving the dispute? 
Senator Joseph Ball (R., Minn.) and H. H. Burton (R., Ohio) 
engaged in a vigorous discussion over this point, With 
Senator Ball contending that a permanent member veto must 
always apply to these articles. Senator Burton, on the 
other hand, maintained that if a permanent member was 
involved in a dispute needing pacific settlement, such a 
party must abstain from voting during this "recommendation" 
stage. He cited an interview with Dr. Pasvolsky during the 
Senate Foreign Relations Co~~ittee hearings in which Dr. 
Pasvolsky asserted, to the concurrence of the Co~~lttee. 
that a great power involved in a dispute must abstain from 
voting during considerations of pacific settlement. Burton 
aptly pointed out that a great power veto prior to the dis­
cussion and recommendation stage of pacific settlement would 
amount to a "double veto." Senator Connally, t.oJ'ho was 
involved in the vIri ting of the Charter, agreed Ni th Senator 
16 
Burton and added that the absolute privilege of a great 
power veto applied exclusively to Chapter VII, Article 39, 
which applied to Security Council recommendations for action 
regarding IIthreats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of 
aggression" as opposed to suggested means of pacific settle­
1
mente In short, the Senate concluded that a permanent 
member is debarred from voting if that member is directly 
involved in a dispute which is subject to peaceful settle­
ment techniques, but can veto any proposal for enforcement 
action under Article 39. 
The debate over application of the veto under the 
various articles of the Charter then expanded into a much 
broader discussion about the propriety of the veto rule in 
relation to the role and duties of the Security Council. 
'rhe preponderance of senators envisi oned the Security 
Council as the "enforcement agency" of the United Nations 
and saw the need for great power consensus in order to 
ensure effective collective action. The Council was respon­
sible for affording pacific methods of preserving the peace 
When possible, but when such pacific methods failed it would 
then be necessary to enforce peace through economic and 
military power. Such economic and military power could be 
exercised, according to most of the senators, as a means of 
l U•S., co~ressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
 
(1945) lKC, Part 0, a009-80l1.
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arresting a conflict while it was still in its minor stages. 
Senator Burton apparently spoke for the majority of 
the Senate when he expressed the opinion that a United 
Nations peace-keeping force would consist primarily of 
soldiers and supplies contributed by the Big Five. There­
fore, he said that the Big Five must have the veto power, 
otherwise a situation might arise which would be "much like 
calling upon a sheriff to arrest himself."l He submitted 
that such an experience would be the death knell of the 
organization and also a direct order to start World War II. 
He argued: 
The veto right in such a case is, therefore, a 
straightforward way of recognizing the limitation 
of the powersZof enforcement that are i~~erent in 
this Charter. 
Senator Connally added that the veto was a realistic 
compromise with the unreasonable League requirement that 
there must always be complete unanimity for action. The 
Charter retained the unanimity principle only where it was 
imperative. He said that it was absurd to expect the United 
States or any other great power to send its troops to a 
trouble spot when it did not want to. He believed that as 
long as the Big Five possessed ample material resources and 
military might and were united in their efforts to preserve 
peace, it would be impossible for a major war to erupt. 
lIbid., Part 5. 5947. 
J
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However, he recognized that a great power could still 
initiate a war if it was desirous of doing so.l 
Senator Guy Corydon (Republican, Oregon) stated that 
the veto provision showed profound wisdom on the part of the 
drafters of the Charter. He maintained that it provided a 
realistic margin of elasticity Which recognized the stark 
realities of power politics. Without it, he predicted that 
the United Nations would "be torn into shreds and become a 
scrap of paper" the first time a great power refused to 
2 
abide by a decision reached by the Security Council. 
Senator Eugene Millikin (R., Col.) agreed that the 
use of force against one of the Big Five would probably 
write the epitaph of the United Nations because it would 
admit the inability of the United Nations to perform its 
conciliatory functions; hence, the need for a great power 
veto was imperative. Like a majority of senators, he had 1n 
mind an international police force that t-'I1'ould put out "brush 
firaa ll rather than a massive international army. He 
believed that such police power 
• • • will probably reqUire no more than very modest 
forces, that it will be infrequent, and will be aimed 
at nations which, because of their international and 
military unimportance, have not been able to find a 
powerful patron.3 
II" id 6876 • 
....l:L....-. • 
3Ibid .• 13032. 
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Senator James Tunnell (D., Del.) went on to point out 
that the small nations also supported the veto principle, as 
shown by their support during the drafting of the Charter. 
He said that the lesser nations recognized that it was to 
their best interest not to have a disproportionate amount of 
responsibility in relation to their actual power. Further­
more, he stated that their interest was identical to that of 
the great powers in respect to the prevention of war, and, 
consequently, they realized that the veto best served their 
objective of maintaining world peace. He concluded that the 
reticence of the small nations on the veto question indi­
cated their tacit approval, and added that they realized 
that a universal veto would be an infringement on the 
1
sovereignty of the Big Five. 
There were several senators who expressed reserva­
tions about, or outright opposl tlon to the veto. Senator 
Vandenberg, for example, thought that a practlcal formula 
should be devised to prevent a great power from invoking the 
veto to deter action by the Security Council after that 
2 
power had intentionally acted as an aggressor. Senator 
James Eastland (D., Miss.) felt that the rule of unanimity 
among the Big 1"lve was a "grave 'l'leakness ll that seriously 
-
2I. Ibid., Part 11, A1546.Ibid., 8098. 
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diminished the effectiveness of the United Nations. l 
Senator Claude Pepper (D., Fla.) agreed, saying that the 
veto could f1emasculate" the United Nations by enabling the 
Big Five to shirk their responsibilities to the other 
2 
nations of the world. It should be emphasized, however, 
that the talk of reservations or opposition on the part of 
these senators was minimal and low-keyed. As one would have 
expected, there was little objection to a provision that ..•....•.........•.........'
.....•..~.......•.•. 
.~ 
protected United States power and sovereignty. 
The only other question that came up over the veto 
concerned the possibility of one of the Big Five exercising 
a Ulate" veto. Senator Leverett Saltonstall (H., 1"18,ss.) ~;, 
.b~hypothesized a situation where the Big Five voted unanl­
r..•~.~.·.·;.· ~' 
mously to use force, then later a particular nation sought .~ 
to use its veto because it had changed its mind or disagreed it( 
~. 
rwith the method by which the approved action was being 
administered. Senator BUrton retorted that this would be 
unreasonable, for if the United States Wished to change its 
course in the middle of a campaign, any nation could do the 
same, thus rendering the United Nations impotent. He said 
that once the Big Five had unanimously made an affirmative 
decision, their indiVidual right to use the veto was surren= 
dered. J 
...
 
1 Ibid., Part 5, 8072. 2Ib1d • 
-
JIbld .• 8015. 
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II. ARlfICLE 43 AND T1ffi COl\'1r1I'fMENT OF UNITED STATES TROOPS 
Some of the most significant debate over ratification 
of the Charter concerned paragraph one of Article 43, which 
prOVided for the contribution of armed forces, assistance, 
and facilities to the United Nations by the member states. 
Here, it may be said, lay the crux of the Charter: the 
commitment of a portion of a nation's military resources to 
an international peace force for the maintenance of world 
peace and security. The primary issue confronting the 
Senate in this regard was to what extent the United States 
Wished to entrust the backbone of its power--its military 
might--to an organization largely beyond its sovereign con­
trol. Paragraph one of Article 4) reads as follows: 
I. All Members of the United Nations, in order 
to contribute to the maintenance of international 
peace and security, undertake to make available to 
the Security Council, on its call and in accordance 
with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, 
assistance, and facilities, including rights of 
passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security. 
The language of thiS paragraph required the Senate to 
determine the degree of commitment which the United States 
would make. Some of the questions that structured the 
debate on this issue were these: \·lhat constituted an "armed 
forcel! and what quota would be ,'3upplled by the member 
states?~!hat sort of "special agreement ll must be made to 
establish such a force? What sort of conflict reqUired 
...
 
22 
international intervention to preserve "international peace 
and security"? Who should be the primary contributors to 
such an armed force, the smaller states or the great powers? 
And, last, what should the role of such a force be: to act 
merely as a "policeman ll responsible for "putting out brush 
fires,ll or to carry out massive collective action against an 
aggressor in an all-out effort to end hostilities? 
The most intensive and lengthy debate over ratifica­
tion involved paragraph three of Article 43. This provision 
presented a crucial question to the Senate: Who, at the 
national level, would be responsible for committing United 
States troops to the international force--the President or 
Congress? Furthermore, if Congress was responsible for such 
a decision, should the commitment be made by joint resolu­
tlon of both houses or should such responsibility l1e with 
the Senate under its constitutional treaty obligations? The 
Senate, it seemed, was charged with decldi~~ this issue, for 
paragraph three said only that such troop commitments "shall 
be subject to ratification by the signatory states in 
accordance tqi th their respective constitutional processes. If 
The international peace force: its role ~ make-~. 
Many of the senators felt that the commitment of United 
,states military resources, particularly troops, posed as an 
ominous threat to the sovereignty and security of the 
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nation. A common theme throughout this portion of the 
debate was the meanacing possibility of United States 
entanglement in a foreign struggle which would eventually 
expand into a major war, perhaps even a world war. This 
contention will be discussed in detail in a sUbsequent 
chapter, for it was a primary argument propounded by the 
opposition as to why the United States should not join the 
United Nations. The purpose of this ch~pter is, however, to 
examine those problems inherent in determining the creation, 
role, and magnitude of an international peace force and the 
procedure by which United States resources should be com­
mitted to such a force. 
Article 43 required, among other things, that the 
member states supply an "armed force ll to the Security 
Council. Surprisingly, debate about the nature of such a 
force and the extent of United states contributions thereto 
was minimal. A close analysis of the discussion on the 
floor reveals several possible reasons for this paucity of 
debate. First, the Senate's members were not worried about 
the nature of such a force if they could be assured that the 
ultimate decision regarding troop quotas and commitments 
would remain under their control. And second, the senators 
realized that the releasin~ of such a force must be in 
"accordance with a special agreement or agreements, II and in 
light of this consideration they were willing to postpone 
-
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the problem of determining the exact nature of such a force 
until after ratification--provided, of course, they reserved 
the exclusive right to formulate such "special agreement(s)." 
Senator Connally emphasized that the debate over ratifica­
tion should deal with the issue of ratification and not with 
technical questions concerning the implementation of specific 
provisions. He explained that if the Charter should be 
ratified, it would later become necessary for the Senate to 
deliberate on such technical questions at the appropriate 
ltime. 
There was, however, a limited amount of debate over 
the nature of the international peace force. Senator 
I'lillikin described his concept of such a force as a "police 
2pOi'ler II requiring "no more than very modest forces. II He 
further stated that police action by such a force would be 
aimed at small nations that had not aligned with a great 
3 power. His statements all but stood alone in the matter of 
the composition and role of the international force. Very 
few senators challenged his particular vision of the pro­
posed force, thus indicating a general consensus that such a 
force would be small in size, would be comprised of limited 
troop quotas from the member states, and would only engage 
in policing activity involving disputes among minor powers. 
lIbid., 8028-8029. 
3Ibid. I 
J 
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His co~~ent about a great power-small power alignment 1s 
noteworthy, because it was a forecast that after World 
War II the smaller nations would generally choose to align 
with the great powers for protection. It may, therefore, be 
inferred that Senator Millikin doubted the effective appli­
cability of an international police force, since those small 
nations which were aligned with a great power faction would 
rely on that power to use the veto as a means of preventing 
collective action against them. 
One of the few senators who differed somewhat with 
Senator Millikin about the nature of an international peace 
force was Senator Burton. He observed: 
The armed forces of the UN will be, therefore, an 
Allied force comparable to that used in World War II, 
but greatly reduced in size and cost. This reduction 
will reflect the reduced need for Allied army forces 
in the light of the Allied victory over all enemy 
forces in the world and in the light of the con­
tinUing cooperation of the Allied Nations through 
the formation of the UN, dedicated to the maintain­
ance of international peace and security.l 
Burton, in short, optimistically envisioned a grand peace­
time alliance among the powers that had been victorious in 
the late t,'1ar. 
A small part of the debate dealt with the meanin~ of 
the "rights of passage l1 phrase in Article 43. Senator Abe 
IVlurdock (D., Utah) asked if this phrase could be stretched 
to include the "occupation" of a country for the purpose of 
IIbid •• Part 5. 594 8. 
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maintaining international peace and security. Senator 
Burton replied that "you cannot fight just part of a war; 
you must fight it all the waY,t1 even if the occupation of a 
country by the international force becomes necessary to pre­
1 
serve the peace. Senator Connally partially agreed, but 
went on to explain that the "rights of passage" provision 
was added to the Charter at the request of France, which 
felt such a provision might be necessary to enable the 
United Nations to take action against a possible aggressor 
(e.g., a march through Belgium to facilitate military opera­
tions against Germany). Connally stated that in such a case 
"passage" would have to be construed narrowly, thus applying 
only to occupation and control of a country's military 
facilities in order to perform necessary military opera­
2tions. 
Some concern was expressed among the senators as to 
what sort of conflict warranted intervention on the part of 
the international force. The consensus was that the United 
Nations should not become embroiled in a domestic revolu­
tlon or uphold the interest of a colonial power to preserve 
the dependent status of its colonies. Senator Connally 
pointed out that paragraph seven of Article 2 forbade the 
United Nations from intervening in any matter that was 
21 Ibid., Part 6, 8016. Ibid. 
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essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a nation. 
He also maintained that a quarrel between a mother country 
and its colony (e.g., Great Britain versus India) would be 
considered domestic in nature and thereby foreclose United 
Nations intervention. l 
United States Military Commitments: Congress~. the 
President. The Senate felt it imperative that the final 
authority to determine the contribution of American troops 
and other military resources must be vested in Congress and 
not in the Presidency. Many days of meticulous debate were 
devoted to this SUbject so as to leave no doubt as to the 
special legislative intent. Paragraph three of Article 43 
stated that the contribution of armed forces and other mlli­
tary assistance by the member states on the Security Council 
should be determined by Ifagreement or agreements II bett'lieen 
the Secur! ty Council and its members in accordance l.,ri th each 
nation's "constitutional processes." Coupled with the con­
cern over possible presidential troop commitments was an 
important, yet secondary issue as to whether such authority 
lay ultimately with the Senate under its constitutional 
treaty-making powers or whether the final decision must be 
accomplished under a joint resolution by Congress. 
The opinion was offered throughout the debate that 
J 
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the President was not empowered With the authority to deter­
mine initially the quota of United states troops and mili­
tary resources to the United Nations. No Senator advocated 
the contrary, and a close examination of the debate reveals 
that the question of troops being committed by executive 
agreement was hardly a point of controversy, as consensus 
was unanimous that such commitment was the responsibility of 
the legislative branch. Nevertheless, the senators con­
tinually re-emphasized this point to emphasize their ~osi-
tlon. President Truman himself corroborated the Senate's 
position when he wrote Senator Kenneth McKellar (D., Tenn.) 
from Potsdam on July 27, 1945: 
When any such agreement or agreements fregarding 
Article 43 and the commitment of troops to the 
Security Council by the member states) are negotiated 
it will be my purpose to ask the Congress for appro­
priate legislation to approve them. l 
Senator Claude Pepper (D., Fla.) defended the view of 
the Senate by tracing the constitutional source of authority 
which directed Congress to determine troop quotas and com­
mitments. He insisted that Congress alone had the right to 
declare war and to prOVide for the common defense, and he 
also argued that those powers not expressly granted by the 
Constitution were inherently possessed by Congress as a 
result of United states y. Curtiss \.Jright corporation 299 
U.s. 318 (1936) and United states v. Arjona 120 U.S. 479 
lI~t id., 79trl Congress. 8H35. 
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(1887).1 
Heated arguments ensued over the role of the Presi­
dent in executing the responsibilities conferred on him by 
Congress after the troop quotas had been assigned to the 
United Nations. For, after a treaty has been made, the 
President clearly has the power to use forces in such a way 
as to uphold the supreme law of the land. Did this mean 
that the President could commit such troops at his pleasure, 
or should he first be required to consult with Congress? 
Also, could he increase the quota granted him by Congress, 
or must he limit his commitment to those troops specifically 
authorized by Congress? These questions were never neatly 
resolved. Some senators, for example, felt that for the ~..•...•...i' ~' 
President to co~mit previously approved United states troop 
~ 
~ 
contingents to the international force without first con- ~ 
suIting Congress was tantamount to treason. Others, how- ~ 
ever, argued that this was simply a legitimate exercise of 
his executive duties. 
110st senators supported the position taken by Senator 
Millikin that once the troops had been co~mitted to the 
United Nations they were subject to the command of that 
organization at the discretion of the President in his role 
of defending the nation. If the need should ever arise for 
committing forces that exceeded the original allocation 
1 n LIb1;d., b07t. 
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intended for "policingil action. however,--that is, if the 
United Nations should be threatened With the necessity of 
conducting war then the President would be required to keep 
Congress fully advised of the situation and provide Congress 
with ample time to review the question, give instruction. 
l
and authorize the additional forces. 
A substantial minority of senators argued that the 
President need not consult Congress for additional troops if 
a situation dictated that he use "reasonable" force to 
uphold the Charter and provided, of course, that the action 
was to be Within the "policing" authority of the United 
Nations. Those who supported this argument contended that 
since the Charter was a treaty, the President had the legal 
right to see that it was fully carried out. Senator Albert 
Chandler (D., y~.) pointed out that the President had so 
acted on numerous occasions. The last time was in 1941, 
when President Roosevelt sent troops to Iceland to relieve 
the British in protecting the interests of American shipping 
2
and commerce. Ironically, Senator F. William Fulbright 
(D., Ark.) was one of the most vociferous supporters of 
presidential authority in this area. In regard to the posi­
tion advocated by several senators that any additional troop 
allocations must be approved by Congress, even if for 
1 Ibid., 8032-8033. 
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policing purposes, Fulbright said: 
Would not the Senator ~ucas of Illinoi~ agree 
that if the Congress undertook to restrict the 
President in the exercise of the power which is 
placed within his discretion for purpose of enforcing 
law and protecting our interest, it would be wrong 
to do so?l 
Senator Chandler suggested that a concurrent reso1u­
tion be passed that would authorize the President to use 
United States armed forces in order to fulfill any obliga­
tions that arose under the Charter. He wished to delegate 
the right to use such power to the President until checked 
by Congress, and he argued that such a check could be 
invoked at any time prior to the formal declaration of a 
2
state of war. 
A few senators, notably Senators Wheeler, Langer, and 
Shipstead, argued that the President had no constitutional 
authority Whatever to commit troops. Senator Wheeler con­
strued John Foster Dulles' testimony before the Senate 
Foreign Helations Committee very narrowly. Dulles had said 
that it was his view and he believed the view of the entire 
United States delegation that any agreement to prOVide mili= 
tary forces to the United Nations would have to be submitted 
to the Senate for negotiation and ratification in the same 
~ 
way as a treaty.~ Wheeler argued that what Dulles had said 
?1 ~Ibid., 8115.Ibid. 
J1b1d ., 7990. 
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not only applied to the original military contingent, but 
likewise applied to any sUbsequent action involving that 
contingent. In short, according to Wheeler. the President 
could never commit troops Without first of all consulting 
1Congress. 
United states military Commitments: Senate ratifica­
tion VB. joint resolution. After the debate had clearly 
recorded the view of the Senate that any co~mitment of 
United States military forces to be used in excess of 
"policing" action could not be made simply by presidential 
executive order. it became necessary to determine whether 
such a co~mitment must be determined by Senate ratification 
or by joint resolution of both houses of Congress. The 
importance of this question ~.ras considerable, for if it Nas 
deoided that such authority lay alone ttl! thin the purview of 
the Senate, then any authorization for additional military 
contl~sents would require a two-thirds supporting vote as 
opposed to the simple majority needed for a joint resolu­
tion. l~ore time was devoted to this issue than to any other 
si~7,le question during the Senate debate, and the final 
decision was left hanging, although about th~ee-foUTths of 
those senators speaking on the issue favored the joint reso­
lution approach. 
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Those senators favoring the joint resolution offered 
numerous arguments as to why this method was necessary. 
Senator James Tunnell (D., Del.) stated that the Senate was 
presently considering ratification of the United Nations 
Charter as a treaty between the member states. After the 
Charter had been ratified, he maintained, the United States 
would be bound by Article 43 to make available to the 
Securi ty Council "armed forces, assistance, and facilities II 
by "special agreement or agreements. II He further insisted 
that a treaty was an agreement between independent states, 
and the Security Council could not be considered as such. 
He said that to require ratification of later agreements 
would be the equivalent of recognizing the Security Council 
as a sovereign state, indeed, as a "super state." By doing 
that, the United States would abdicate its own sovereignty 
by placing the Security Council on a "higher plane than it 
was ever intended to be placed. . . . Furthermore, 
Senator Tunnell foresa\'1 a dangerous possibi1i ty in consider­
ing SUbsequent agreements with the Security Council as 
treaties: 
••• the agreement with the Security Council Simply 
determines the amount of the assistance, as I under­
stand; and I do not believe that such an agreement 
should be given the sanctity of a treaty. because I 
think there are implications in that position to 
which we might hesitate to agree. 2 
2 Ibid., 809'1.8096. 
Tunnell also feared that by viewing every agreement between 
the Security Council and United States as a separate treaty, 
the United States would be forced to follow through on obli­
gations incurred through the treaty, even though such obli-
Igations might later prove to be unwise. Senator Lister 
Hill (D., Ala.) aptly described the Charter as a llmaster 
agreement ll and asserted that it was unreasonable and imprac­
ticable to expect the Senate to ratify any future agreements 
by a two-thirds vote Without giVing the House of Representa­
2 
tives any say in the matter. 
Senator George Aiken (R., Vt.) feared that a treaty 
requirement after ratification would permit a small minority 
of senators to sabotage the military effectiveness of the 
United Nations. He suspected that even though there was 
presently a wave of enthusiasm for the Charter, a small core 
of senators would not hesitate to nullify the participation 
of the United States in the United Nations if given the 
3 
chance at a later date. 
A minority of senators, includln~ such influential 
figures as Vandenberg, Connally, and Robert 'raft (H.. Ohi 0) 
contended that any additional military commitments should 
definitely be ratified by the Senate. This minority relied 
heavily on the testlmo~v given by John Foster Dulles before 
L~bl ' 
.L .. ll., 8096 • 
J 
Ibid., dO? • 
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the Foreign Relations Committee, when he said: 
•• • the agreement which will provide for the United 
states military contingent will have to be negotiated 
and then submitted to the Senate for ratification the 
same way as a treaty.l 
They also stressed the fact that the two senators Who had 
attended the parley in San Francisco, Connally and Vanden­
berg, both favored the treaty approach over that of the 
joint resolution. These two senators refused to Vigorously 
or actively support the treaty approach, however, and care­
fully guarded their image as objective, bipartisan leaders 
whose paramount concern was ratification of the Charter. 
They both emphasized that while they favored the treaty 
method, they did not feel that this was an issue of major 
significance; their main concern on this matter was that the 
2 
fTesident would not be responsible for such commitments. 
Senator Taft, on the other hand, argued strongly and 
persistently that a treaty was necessary in such a case. He 
pointed out that there is no place in the Constitution Which 
grants Co~sress the authority to make or approve any agree­
ment with a foreign nation by joint resolution. He answered 
his opponents' contention that the Constitution prOVided 
"Congress ll (meaning both Houses) i'11 th the power to "raise 
and support armies ll by replyir\<5 that such authority did not 
extend to "agreements." Moreover, he insisted that if and 
? 
11b1(1., 7990. -Ib~d •• 7990-7992. 
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when Congress ratified the Charter, the country would 
thereby enter into a general treaty arrangement with 
signatory nations. Any special agreement at a later date 
must therefore be classified as a supplemental treaty to the 
general treaty, since such agreement would involve and 
affect all other nations in the United Nations with whom the 
1
original treaty was made. Senator Guy Corydon (R., ore.) 
criticized those of his colleagues who supported the joint 
resolution alternative. He felt they were inconsistent by 
~( ~;r
,4'1'also supporting Article 18 of the Charter, Which required ~} 
~.'.•.:.. ;•.. 
that decisions on "important" questions must be made by a ~lr !zl't' ~f' 
\two-thirds majority. He noted that this was the same ratio , 
it;tijt
required for Senate ratification, and questioned how such ~,
 
fervent Charter supporters could also assault the treaty ~I
 
~'
 approach. ') C 
No definite conclusions were reached on the treaty- ~.' 
joint resolution issue, for after those senators desiring to 
air their views had been given their chance on the floor, 
they were content to let the subject rest as closed until 
after the vote on ratification. On Saturday, June 28, 
President 'ITuman appeared briefly before the Senate-- just 
before a vote on the Charter was to be taken--and proclaimed 
that military agreements with the United Nations would be 
1 Ibid., 799q. 
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submitted to both Houses of Congress. His remark evoked no 
protest from the Chamber, thus setting the precedent for 
joint congressional determination of United States military 
contingents to the United Nations. 
III. THE VALIDITY OF RE:GIONAL AGREEIVlENTS 
Some concern was expressed among the senators over 
the possibility that United States regional agreements would 
be overshadowed by the United Nations, thus losing -their 
1/
preeminence and, eventually, their validity. This concern 
was obviously related to the overall question of sovereignty, 
for the same senators Who displayed fear over the creation 
of a IIworld government" and the "unconstitutional tl commit­
ment of United States armed forces to the United Nations 
also questioned the validity of United Nations intervention 
in disputes concerning previous United States treaties and 
regional agreements. Most prominent among these were 
Senators Harlan Bushfield (H., S.D.), \'lheeler, Langer, and 
Shlpstead. These senators seemed particularly concerned 
about the effect that Article 43, which required the member 
states to commit military contingents to the United Nations, 
would have on the Monroe Doctrine and the recently enacted 
Act of Chepultepec. The MOl1rOe Doctrine, promulgated by 
lIbid., Part 12, AJ681. 
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President James Monroe in 1823, stated, in effect, that any 
infringement on the sovereignty of Latin American states in 
the New World by a European nation would be looked upon as a 
challenge to the United States and would be met accord­
1ingly. The Act of Chapultepec, which was adopted 'early in 
1945 at Mexico City, was a formal declaration of cooperation 
among all the American nations to meet any threat from 
2
abroad. 
The problem of regional security arrangement versus a 
United Nations peace force had its origins in friction at 
San Francisco, where, according to Senator Vandenberg, this 
issue presented an impasse that betokened disaster. 3 When 
the Charter was referred to the Senate for consideration, it 
was feared that a similar impasse might develop. Senator 
Bushfield contended that the Monroe Doctrine Was exempt from 
Chapter VIII of the Charter, which referred to regional 
arrangements, because it was not promUlgated as a regional 
arrangement, but as a unilateral declaration by the United 
States. Senator Connally replied that the Doctrine could no 
IRlchard Hofstadter, William Miller, and Daniel 
Aaron, '1'11e American RepUblic, Vol. I (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 360. 
2cecll V. Crabb, Jr., Nnerlcan Foreign Policy in the 
Nuclear ~e (second edition: New York: Harper and Row. 
1965), p. '" 2?0 • 
3U•S., Gong;resslona1 Hecord, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1945) IXC, Part 6, 795~. 
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longer be considered unilateral, since it had come to be 
1
respected and recognized by nations throughout the world. 
During the debate it soon became eVident that those 
few senators who feared United Nations infringement on 
regional agreements would be unable to rally any general 
anti-United Nations sentiment by attacking this issue. The 
authors of the Charter had taken special pains to avoid 
trouble in this regard by providing in Chapter VIII that 
those matters relating to international peace and security 
should be referred to regional arrangement whenever appro­
priate and possible. No member of the United Nations was to 
refer a dispute to the Security Council until an attempt had 
been made to achieve a peaceful solution through pacific 
settlement. As a result of these provisions, almost all of 
the potential resistance to the Charter on this basis was 
stymied in advance. 
Senator Tunnell argued that the Charter would not 
cancel the Monroe Doctrine, but would instead complement it. 
He also insisted that this Doctrine would be more clearly 
defined through lts recognition by the member states of the 
United Nations. LikeWise, he felt that the United Nations 
would positively aid in the enforcement of the Doctrine, 
because if a difficulty should arise, the United states 
t'Jou1cl have not only the support and assistance of the 
111)1(1., 8063.
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nations of the Western Hemisphere, but presumably of the 
entire United Nations. Consequently, he said that the 
Charter would act to fortify instead of destroy the Monroe 
lDoctrine.
Senator Vandenberg pointed out that the United states 
would in no way be prevented from contributing troops to the 
solution of a regional problem. He defended the value of 
regional arrangements as a way of preventing local 'conflicts 
from spreading while emphasizing their compatibility with an 
2international peace force. As a result of the persuasive 
abilities and tact displayed by such senators as Tunnell and 
Vandenberg, the "regionalist" senators were mollified into 
silence by the near unanimous support for some kind of an 
international peace force by their colleagues. 
IV. THE POlifERS OF TEE UNITED STATES DELEGATE 
~nother point which the Senate wanted to clarify was 
the projected power of the United States chief delegate to 
the Security CounCil. To whom, for example, would the dele­
gate be answerable? To what extent would he be allowed to 
make decisions without consulting the President or Congress? 
And What limits should be placed on him to curtail his 
potentially great decision-making power? 
IIbid., 13099. 2Ib1d ., Part 11. A1546. 
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Senator Shipstead expressed extreme concern over what 
he felt to be the extraordinary power of the delegate. He 
believed that the person acting as delegate would be endowed 
With powers exceeding those of any other representative of 
the United states Government. Indeed, he feared that the 
delegate would even be empowered With the authority to 
plunge the United States into war Without even consulting 
Congress. Shipstead insisted that "tl[e cannot permit our 
representative to sit on the Security Council endowed with 
1
equal powers With a totalitarian representative. II He pro­
posed instead that the delegate be sUbject to legislative 
control by reqUiring him to make monthly reports to a 
special Senate committee created expressly for this purpose. 
He asserted that this committee should be composed of an 
equal number of representatives from both major political 
parties and should possess the authority to vote on an~ 
Security CounCil question requiring a unanimous vote. In 
the case of a tie, the President would cast the deciding 
vote. 2 Senator Edward Moore (R., Okl.) shared Senator 
Shipstead's concern to a degree, as evidenced by Senate 
Resolution 158, which was referred to the Foreign Relations 
Committee. This resolution proposed that the delegate would 
be under the direction of the President and that any deci­
sian to commit United states troops must be referred to 
2Ibid., 8123.lIbid., kart 6, 8122. 
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Congress by the President before a vote could be cast by the 
delegate. Furthermore, the delegate would be expressly pro­
hibited from co~~ittlng the United States to any spending. 
loaning, or borrowing of money in excess of the police 
authority assumed under Article 43 unless Congress had 
appropriated money for this purpose or passed a law specifi­
1
cally authorizing such action. 
Most of the senators were not in accord with the 
arguments for circumscribing the power of the delegate to 
the extent advanced by Senators Moore and Shipstead. The 
majority maintained that the delegate should have some lee­
way in making decisions and that Congress did not have 
either the time or desire to evaluate every vote he would be 
called on to cast in the Council. The prevailing view was 
that in those cases not involving commitments in excess of 
police action the President should exercise direct authority 
and direction over the delegate. These senators regarded 
the delegate as nothing more than an ambassador who would be 
dealing largely with routine operations and reporting 
through the State Department to the President. Senator 
Charles Andrews (D., Fla.) said that when an important ques­
tlon came UP. the Secretary of State or even the President 
himself should sit on the CounCil. 2 The general consensus. 
21 
Ibid •• 7746-7747. Ibid .• 8176. 
.'~,.-----------------------g
 
43 
then. was that the delegate would be only a diplomatic agent 
of the President, who in turn would have to consult with 
Congress before acting in a situation that might lead to 
war. 
V. JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
Chapter XIV of the Charter, establishing the Inter­
national Court of Justice. was sUbject to varying interpre­
tation by the Senators. The crux of the task facing the 
Senate was to ascertain the extent of the Court's jurisdic­
tion. Chapter XIV was equivocal on this question, saying 
only that 
Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to 
comply with the decision of the International Court 
of justice in any case to which it is a party. 
'fhe vi tal questions as to what types of controversies I'lould 
be adjudicated by the Court and whether such controversies 
should be submitted for review volunarily or by compulsion 
were left unanswered by the Charter. It was therefore 
proper for the Senate to scrutinize the Charter and seek to 
determine the kind of judicature that should be entrusted to 
the Court. 
Senator Wayne Morse (R., ore.) and Senator Millikin 
engaged in a lively exchange on the floor over this issue. 
Morse felt that the path to world peace and order could be 
achieved only after the nations of the world agreed to 
accept a system of international law under which all nations 
44 
consented to sUbject themselves to the compulsory jurisdic­
tion of the Court. He believed that only in such a case 
could the Court be instrumental in solving disputes while 
facilitating rules of order and reason among nations. The 
Court, he stated, would not be as sensational as the 
Security Council, and thus it would lack much of the latter's 
glamorous appeal and publicity. Nevertheless, he believed 
that it would be more effective because it would be the only 
alternative to war when disagreements reached a stalemate, 
and because it would compel countries to submit their dis­
1putes to the rule of law and accept a verdict. He felt, 
too, that the legal approach was the only real approach to 
peace, and he submitted a resolution to the Foreign Rela­
tions Committee that would have required the United states 
to submit any dispute of an international nature to the 
2 
International Court of Justice for adjudication. 
Senator Millikin intimated that Morse's arguments 
were rather idealistic and thus impractical. He was partic­
ularly concerned that the IIHackworth Opinion,!! discussed by 
~orse, should not be construed as an expression of senatorial 
3
opinion that 1fiould become binding in the future. This 
opinion, 't'ihich l'V"as expressed by Judge Hac]{Worth on behalf of 
the state Department in a letter to Senator Vandenberg, 
? 
lIbid., 8159-8164. ~ I hid ., 8164 • 
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said, in essence, that in a case where the United states was 
simply involved in collecting claims from another country 
and the settlement involved no possible loss on the part of 
the United States, the President could submit the case to 
the Court without consulting Congress. l Millikin's concern 
over this opinion revealed a strong conviction that Congress 
should always retain the ultimate say as to what cases 
should be submitted to the Court for review, and that com­
pulsory jurisdiction by the Court would be a clear encroach­
ment on the sovereignty of the United States. 
Some debate also centered around the question of who 
should determine whether a dispute would be referred to the 
Court--the Senate only or the Congress as a Whole. This 
question, however, was not long discussed, since there were 
no strong objections to the interpretation advanced by 
Senator Connally that this was clearly the President's 
prerogative. If the President elected to submit the issue 
to Congress as a whole, this would, of course, be acceptable. 
Only when there was a dispute about a treaty approved by the 
2 
Senate would the Senate retain exclusive jurisdiction. 
VI. I'HB TUIE PAC'rQfi IN HATIFICATION 
At the outset of the debate, some discussion centered 
? 
~Ibid. 
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around the problem of how much time should be devoted to a 
discussion of the Charter prior to the vote an ratification. 
Mast of the senators realized that an in-depth debate aver 
every provision of the Charter would be eXhausting and con­
sume many months. Furthermore, they also realized that the 
Charter had been formally drafted and that it Was nat within 
their sphere of authority to alter its basic form. They 
were only responsible for interpreting those provisions that 
were open to ambiguity and needed clarification. It was 
therefore necessary for them to determine in advance how 
much time and coverage of principal issues would be adequate. 
All but a few senators realized the importance of 
adeQuately reviewing the Charter and nat glassing over pro­
visions that might be SUbject to varying interpretations. 
Senator George La Follette (Progressive, Wis.) pointed aut 
that the Senate could do the Charter no more harm than to 
rush through its passage. He said that this would give the 
world the impression that the Senate did not consider the 
document worthy of spirited debate and did nat consider its 
provisions of SUfficient importance to merit examination. 
He said that there was not a Senator present who could out­
line all of the intricate matters contained in the Charter, 
and he felt that it Nas imperative that the American public 
hear of the kinds of interpretations that 110uld be placed 
~~'~ip.----------------------__~
 
1 
upon the language of the Charter. Senator Styles Bridges 
(R., N.H.) said that the Senate not only had a responsibil­
ity to elucidate the positive factors contained in the 
Charter, but was also responsible for probing into its weak 
provisions so that the people of the United States would 
have an opportunity to know its faults. He said: 
This is a turning point in the history of our 
government and our people. We are about to enter 
upon a program of world cooperation such as we have 
never before attempted. The deflection from our 
prior course is so great that we must not make it 
blindly. The effect of this document can be to 
chart the course of the world for untold generations 
to follow us. 2 
Senator Fulbright repeated Senator Bridges' concern 
and expressed frustration over the casual manner in which 
the majority of senators were appraising the Charter. He 
said that this document ranked in importance with the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, and he 
felt that the manner in which the Senate was treating it was 
a complete departure from traditional policy in interna­
tional relations. He accused those senators who were 
previously isolationists of cloaking their opposition to the 
Charter in silence and thus presenting to the public an 
image of unani ;:nous Senate support for the Charter. He 
pointed out that the Reciprocal Trade Act and Bretton Woods 
proposals had been vigorously opposed and yet were integral 
2
 
lIbid., Part 5, 6917-6918. Ibid., Part 6, 8165.
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parts of the general plans and purpose of the Charter. He 
said: 
I have a feeling, Nr. President, that perhaps the 
Charter has been oversold, both to the public and to 
the Senate. By this I mean that the obligations and 
responsibi Ii ti es tie are assuming have been played 1 
down and have been presented in a negative manner. 
Senator Alben Barkley (D., Ky.) disagreed with those 
senators who advocated a prolonged debate over all provi­
sions in the Charter. He felt that it was paramount for the 
United States, as a great power, to lead the way in ratify-
lug the Charter. He feared that debate would become bogged 
down in the F'oreign Relations Committee, and he therefore 
recommended a Senate vote to waive the necessity of its 
being reViewed by that Committee. He insisted that all 
senators should have ample opportunity to be heard, but he 
felt that the public was already informed as to the general 
2 
meaning and purpose of the Charter. Moreover, he feared 
that the Chamber debate would become burdensome if the usual 
procedure for ratifying a treaty was followed: if every 
sentence of the Charter was reviewed in step-by-step 
3fashion. '1'he Senate ultimately decided to dispense 'I'll th 
the sentence-by-sentence approach to its debate of the 
Charter. but it emphatically rejected Barkley's proposal for 
waiving the Committee hearings. 
21 Ibid •• Part 5. 6916.Ibid •• 7962. 
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CHAPrER III 
NAJOR ARGUMENTS OF' PROPONEN'TS 
Those senators who supported the Charter offered many 
reasons, ranging from the idealistic to the practical, for 
suggesting it would be in the United states interest to join 
the United Nations. They all felt that the United Nations 
would at least partially eliminate the root causes of war; 
economic and social ills would be reduced through interna­
tional cooperation; political rivalries between nations 
would wane With the advent of international understanding; 
and, aggression-minded leaders would be better contained and 
forced to draw back under the critical scrutiny of the new 
organization. It was also argued that the United Nations 
would actively promote peace through operative channels. 
Collective security, pacific settlement of disputes, 
economic and social collaboration, international debate, 
world law, and trusteeship, would henceforth be employed to 
assure the peace. And last, it was pointed out that the 
United States had a moral obligation to join the United 
Nations over and beyond our selfish interests, for without 
our membership the organization would surely be doomed to 
failure. 
II 
Few of the senators were so naive as to pretend that 
the United Nations would eliminate all war and animosity 
't~,;._---------------- ••••••••••••••••••• jC";'t§r" :" 
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between nations or at once establish international social 
justice and economic prosperity. They realized, of course, 
that the United Nations was an experiment, and as such, 
qUite vulnerable to the mult~arlous forces which had pro­
voked two world wars during the twentieth century and 
brought about the destruction of the League of NationB. It 
was felt, however, that the United Nations offered, at 
worst, a ray of hope--a possibility that some of the goals 
of a peaceful world order might be attained and the ominous 
possibility of a third world war averted by its establish­
ment. 
I. REDUCTION OF THE CAUSES OF WAR 
Before the proponents of the Charter could extol the 
virtues of that document as an avenue to peace, it was first 
of all necessary for them to identify the causes of ~'1ar 
which the Charter proposed to hold in check or eliminate. 
There are many causes of war: poverty, depression, tyra~ni-
cal leaders, distrust and misunderstanding &~on~ nations, 
cut-throat economic competition, imperialism, fanatical 
nationalism, and chaUVinism, to name a few. The senators 
realized that they must relate these causes to the pertinent 
prOVisions of the Charter before it would be possible to 
show the manner in which such causes could be effectively 
removed by the United Natt ons. That is why many hours of 
debate ~'I!ere devoted to the factors t'l!hich had generated past 
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wars. 
An analysis of the debate reveals that the senators 
generally agreed that previous wars had been started by many 
complex and interrelated factors. Most felt, however, that 
the basis of these causal factors was economics. They 
believed, in other words, that economics was the spark that 
ignited a series of explosions, such as the sudden rise of 
demagogic leaders or imperial aggression. Senator H. 
Alexander Smith (R., N.J.) said that wars were often started 
because of competition for raw materials and other basic 
resources. 
1 Senator Burton agreed, and said that he feared 
that Middle East oil interests could very easily set off the 
next war between the great powers. He believed that the 
only remedy for this type of situation would be some sort of 
2 
international regulation of resources. Senator Aiken felt 
that the threat of war would always loom heavy until poverty 
3 
and starvation were eliminated from the world. 
Senator Langer, going further, took the position that 
a selfish wealthy elite fomented wars to promote their own 
economic interests. He accused this class of ignoring the 
rights and freedoms of the worl{ing class Tflhl1e plottll'l,S war. 
He did not believe that the prospect of another war could be 
I V• 8 ., Congressional Hecord, 79th Gong., 1st Sass.
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erased until this class was overthrown and the concepts of 
racial equality, religious respect, and equal educational 
opportunity were established as a way of life. l 
Senator James Murray (D., Mon.) felt that there never 
would have been a World War II had it not been for the 
economic tragedy in Germany which pushed Hitler into power. 
He described the ruthless leaders of nations who promoted 
war as criminals Who captured political power because 
economic and social injustice caused mass unrest. He also 
stated that many of the world's economic problems were 
insoluble on a national level, and he supported economic 
2 
planning on a worldWide scale as the cure for such ills. 
Several senators maintained that political "turmoil" 
was the primary cause of war and that such turmoil operated 
independently of economic issues. These senators apparently 
argued this point chiefly because those senators who con­
tended that economic problems were the primary cause of war 
were, at the same time, using that argument to justify 
United States financial support in such international ven­
tures as the Bretton Woods Agreement, the Reciprocal Trade 
~o;reements Act, and the Un! ted Nati ons Food and AgrIculture 
Organization. Senator Taft was the chief spokesman of thiS 
faction, and he tried hard to prove that political factors 
? 
1 Ibid., Part 11. A2 621~,. ~Ibid .• 81)0. 
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were the basic causes of war. In defense of his position, 
he maintained that a future war was far more likely to 
develop from the political situation in Central Europe than 
from economic distress in other areas of the world. He felt 
that the United States would be "giving away" twenty billion 
dollars a year that could not possibly be paid back under 
the Bretton Woods Agreements While ignoring the impending 
political crises in Poland, Lithuania, and the Balkans. He 
also said that he dOUbted Whether economic problems caused 
the last war, for the conflict was initiated by the more 
affluent nations of the world that craved more power and 
1
territory. 
There were many other factors adduced as causes of 
war, although the discussants of these did not try to 
separate or isolate them from the basic premise that 
economics was the progenitor of all causes. Senator John 
McClellan (D., Ark.) asserted that war was an ongoing 
process--that war tended to beget war. He felt that the 
bitter hatreds and feelings of vengeance between nations 
were a carryover from preVious wars and that these feelings 
festered for generations. As he put it: 
The result is that these smoldering fires can easily 
be fanned and inflamed by tyrannical leadership who 
seek and see the opportunity for military conquest, 
self-ag~randizement, and world power, and then another 
war bec;mes inevttable. 2 
lIbid., 8156. 2Ibid., (}o82. 
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McClellan likewise subscribed to the pessimistic theory that 
animosity between nations was an intrinsic quality of the 
nation-state system and that the rise of diabolical leaders 
1 
was an inevitable consequence of this condition. 
Senator Fulbright believed that the overemphasis on 
"sovereignty" was a key factor in the development of wars. 
He attacked the first principle of Article 2,which insured 
the "sovereign equality" of all the member states, saying 
that this phrase only reinforced that principle which the 
United Nations should be trying to dispose of. He felt that 
this word had a medieval connotation that encouraged and 
justified the passion of extreme nationalism. He believed 
further that sovereignty should end at a nation's domestic 
borders, and he maintained that under its present guise it 
. 2 
was used as a justification for aggressive behaVIor. In 
short, Fulbright equated "sovereignty" Nt th extreme nation­
alism and felt that until such an ethnocentric approach to 
relations among nations was abandoned, there was little hope 
of avoiding another war. 
II. THE CHfuqTEH AS A POSITIVE fH01VlOr.2:H OF PEACE 
The Charter was desl~ned to offer various approaches 
to peace, rangiRg from pacific settlement and functionalism 
o g oe. s ecUrl'ty • T.hese approaches,__ as outlined in thet 1 b 1 
1 Ibid. 2 Ibid.. 7963-7964. 
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Charter, were the essence of that document--the actual means 
by which the United Nations would attempt to maintain world 
peace. Therefore, most of the arguments advanced by the 
proponents as to the necessity for joining the United 
Nations were based upon the operational means which that 
organization would employ to realize peace. Those senators 
who supported the United Nations realized that if they were 
to be successful in selling the Charter as an effective pro­
moter of peace they must convince the skeptics that the 
various approaches to peace provided therein were feasible 
and Viable. 
The economic and social benefits. Because the 
majority of senators felt that economic and social problems 
were the basic cause of war, it was natural for them to 
stress the functional approach to peace. Inis Claude, Jr. 
has defined functionalism as 
••• that part of the mass of organized interna­
tional activities which relates directly to economic, 
social, technical, and humanitarian matters--that is, 
to problems which may be tentatively described as 
non-poli tical. l 
Functionalism, thUS, may be described as an indirect war­
preventive agent, for it operates on the premise that the 
social and economic 111s which generate war must not be 
given the opportunity to arise. 
lClaude, Swords into Plowshares, ~. cit., p. 
,~~p--------------------_. 
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A recurring theme of the functional theorist was the 
need for economic cooperation as a means of avoiding world 
depression and hostile competition among nations. Senator 
Francis p~ers (D., Penn.) stated that World War II had 
shattered American isolationism in all respects except 
economics. He chided those senators who claimed to support 
the United Nations but opposed United States assistance and 
cooperation in the economic area. He pointed out that no 
senators had questioned the cost of waging war, and yet 
several were vociferously opposed to the cost of "waging 
peace" through the Bretton Hoods Proposals. 1 Senator 
~llender supported his argument by noting that World War II 
had cost the United States an estimated two hundred billion 
dollars. and yet there were senators quibbling over six 
billion dollars to be invested in the Bretton Woods Pro­
2 
posals as a means of averting future wars. 
It should be noted that although the Bretton Woods 
Proposals were not a formal part of the Charter. they were 
an integral part of the total concept of international 
economic cooperation. The advocates of economic cooperation 
realized that if they were to be successful in selling the 
merits of the controversial Economic and Social Council, 
they must enlighten those opposed about the vital benefits 
lCongreSSlonal Re~ord. ££. cit •• Part 6, 7699. 
:6>-~ 
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to be derived from participating in such enterprises as the 
International Food and AgricUltural Organization, the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements, and the Bretton Woods Proposals. 
As a result, these proponents discussed at length on the 
need for economic cooperation and the obligation of the 
United States to provide financial rehabilitative support 
for the war-ravaged nations of Europe as a way of bUilding a 
democratic post-War world. Their arguments were implicitly 
linked with the concomitant need for United States support 
for, and participation in the proposed Economic and Social 
Council. 
Those senators who spoke in favor of the Economic and 
Social Council indicated that it would greatly enhance the 
possibility of international peace and security by providing 
an orderly and peaceful procedure for considering important 
questions of a social, economic, or humanitarian nature. 
Senator Burton believed that by getting at the root causes 
of war it would become one of the prominent peace-keeping 
agencies of the United Nations. He felt that by actin~ as 
an advisory and coordinative body, it would gain whole­
hearted cooperation and be held in high esteem by all 
nations. He was sure that every nation would support 
humanitarian endeavors in such areas a human rights and 
health, since these were not related to a nation's size, 
power, or political ideology. Consequently, the Council 
.,\@~~,.p-------------------_.
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ought to be a forum of high potential that would operate on 
a 
1truly democratic basis. 
The Senate was almost unanimous in its support of the 
goals and aspirations of the Economic and Social Council. 
Its structure and purpose were not sUbject to controversy, 
save for some reservations expressed by a small core of 
economic isolationists. It was, after all, difficult to 
oppose the positive social and economic goals espoused by 
the Council. Furthermore, the creation of such an agency 
clearly did not threaten the sovereignty of any nation. 
Even the few die-hard isolationists did not openly speak out 
against the Council, although their opposition to United 
States commitments regarding such agreements as Bretton 
Woods and the International Monetary Fund implied similar 
feelings about the Council. This Was so sinCe U~~ted states 
financial support would be necessary in both cases. 
The IIgrand debate" ~ ~ promoter of peace. In keep­
ing With the democratic ideals proclaimed by the Charter, 
the United Nations was expected to serve as a general sound­
ing board for the nations of the world. Every nation, big 
or small, would have an opportunity to air its views there. 
Nations, or their representatives, would be required to con­
gregate and listen to each other debate the issues of the 
l~bid., Part 5, 5542-5543. 
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day. And, by doin~ so, an awareness would be gained as to 
the ambitions, interests, ideals, and frustrations of the 
member states. Through the new organization, hostilities 
and frustrations could be legitimately vented and empath~ 
promoted. 
In terms of total debate time, the Senate devoted 
only a small portion of its discussion to the concept of the 
UN as a IIgrand debate" about peace. There appear to have 
been several explanations for this. First, this principle 
or concept was an intrinsic element in all phases of the 
Charter; the fact that nations would be assembling and 
listening to one another necessarily implied that a certain 
amount of international understanding would thereby be 
acqUired. Those provisions which provided for a General 
Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, 
and International Court of Justice obviously required the 
nations of the world to engage in multilateral discussion. 
Second, although the senators did not discuss the "grand 
debate ll approach to peace per se, their dialogue was replete 
with allusions to this conception. For example, the argu­
ments in favor of mediation and conciliation as a means of 
promoting peace implied the use of debate and the exchan~e 
of nation~l Views as vitally important. 
Senator Elbert Thomas (D •• Utah) stated that one of 
the iZreatest_. assets Dossessed by the United Nations would be~  
its ability to get the nations of the world together in one 
60 
common meeting place. He felt that this was a basic ingre­
dient of American democracy, and it would serve the same 
purpose in an international forum. He believed that 
The people of the world should realize that the 
fundamental suggestions for international organiza­
tion are based upon the theory of conSUltation, 
deliberation, and discussion; all of which add up 
to the simple word, talk. l 
This statement well illustrates the view held by a majority 
of the senators that constant "talking" is a vital means of 
forestalling war. 
Pacific settlement ~ ~ promoter of peace. In a 
broad sense, pacific settlement simply means the resolution 
of international conflict without violence. It is a mechan­
ism for solving disputes between nations within the estab­
lished legal order of the United Nations. Given the assump­
tlon that nations become embroiled in war as the result of a 
variety of reasons, the concept of pacific settlement holds 
that regardless of the reason for a given conflict, the 
animosity between hostile parties must and shall be resolved 
Without resort to war. Thus, the founders of the United 
Nations created three distinct agencies for resolvll'1..g con­
fIlets by pacific means: the Security Council, the General 
Assembly, and the International Court of Justice. 
The proponents of pacific settlement talked at length 
lIbid., 79th Congress, Part 12, AJOJ9. 
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about these agencies and their prospects for solVing dis­
putes between nations while such disputes were still 
embryonic. The senators did not much discuss pacific means 
of settlement in relation to the General Assembly; instead, 
pacific settlement was envisioned primarily as a function of 
the Security Council. Senator Vandenberg gave a qUite 
thorough description of the procedure by which the Council 
would strive to settle a conflict between two nations. He 
stated that initially an attempt would be made to solve a 
dispute by encouragin~ negotiation between the opposing 
parties. If this failed, an inquiry would then be made into 
the facts alleged by the respective parties. After inquiry, 
the Council, With relevant facts at hand, would serve as 
mediator of the dispute. And finally, if at this point a 
settlement was still not reached. the Council would have to 
Iintervene as an active arbitrator. Vandenberg asserted 
that in his opinion this formula for pacific settlement was 
the real key to maintaining peace. He said: 
It is my profound belief that the pacific contracts 
and consultations which will constantly be maintained 
by the powers--and particularly by the great powers-­
plus the pacific routines which every dispute must 
hereafter exhaust before it is SUbject to any sort 
of sanctions, can and will resolve most. if not all, 
of the controversies which otherwise might lead 
once more to war. 2 
Senator Burton also believed that pacific settlement 
2 
lIbid., Part 5. 6983. Ibid. , 
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by the Security Council would be one of the most prominent 
mechanisms for settling disputes. He stated that although 
there was no legal obligation on the part of either party to 
adhere to the recommendations of the Council. such recommen­
dations would carry tremendous weight and "the parties 
involved will stand before the world in the light of them. "I 
International law ~ ~ promoter of peace. A few 
senators. most notably Walter George (D •• Ga.). Ellender. 
and Morse. envisioned the evolution of international law 
through the International Court of Justice as the primary 
means of attaining international order and mutual respect 
among nations. While the majority of senators basically 
neglected discussion of this body as an agent of peace. 
apparently feeling that it was merely an adjunct to the 
pacific methods employed by the Security Council upon the 
optional submission of the contending parties. the legal 
proponents distinguished the functions of the Court from 
those of the Council by defining the former as a formulator 
and interpreter of international law in its strictest sense. 
Senator I'1orse believed that the Court would be the 
most objective recourse for nations involved in a dispute 
because, unlike the Security Council. there was no great 
power dominance or veto. but instead a staff of impartial 
lIbid •• Part 6. 8011. 
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ljUdges. senator George stated that even though interna­
tional law could not be codified in the same manner as 
domestic law, it would evolve as a principal force in the 
promotion of world peace through its continual application 
2
and interpretation by the Court. 
Senator Morse emphasized that in order for the appli­
cation of international law to be truly effective, it would 
have to be mandatory--that is, those parties engaged in a 
dispute must be required to SUbmit the controversy to the 
Court and be legally bound by its decision. He said that as 
long as nations retained the option of SUbmitting or nonsub­
mitting controversies to the Court, legal adjudication would 
be only an illusion, save in the case of petty disputes in 
which neither nation incurred the risk of a substantial 
3loss. 
Senator Connally typified the position taken by most 
senators who supported the concept of international law as 
an agent of peace but who did not want to abdicate totally 
United States sovereignty by entrusting the Court with man­
datory jurisdiction. He saw the Court's value as that of 
solvin~ disputes of a legal nature, as opposed to the 
Security Council'S responsibility for solving disputes of a 
political nature. He also pointed out that while the 
2 
lIbid., 8161. Ibid.. 8110. 
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court's jurisdiction was optional, a nation could file with 
the Court to have a specific case adjUdicated on a compul­
sory basis, thus compelling that nation to abide by the 
ldecision. 
Trusteeship ~ ~ approach to peace. The concept of 
trusteeship was designed to promote the just administration 
of colonies by the mother country. It was also particularly 
designed to provide for the administration of those dependent 
territories which would be confiscated from the Axis Powers 
after the War. The Senate devoted almost no time at all to 
the discussion of the trusteeship idea, apparently for 
several reasons. First, it was to be voluntary in nature 
and therefore did not threaten the sovereign right of the 
United States to administer its own territories. And 
second, the United States did not have any colonies strictly 
speaking and had yet to determine what territories would be 
retained after World War II. 
Senator Con~ally did make a brief co®~ent in support 
of trusteeship, sayi~~ that it served a beneficial purpose 
by providing for the welfare of the dependent peoples of the 
lIbid., Part 5. 6876. The so-called "CorLnally Amend­
ment" later adopted by the Sen9.te, made certain that the 
World Court's jUrisdiction over U.S. disputes would be . 
optional rather than compulsory. hany observers feel tha~ 
thiS optional jurisdiction has significantly impaired the 
usefulness of the Court. 
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world and by preparing them for eventual self-government. 
He also mentioned that the Trusteeship Council would perform 
a valuable function in draWing a distinction between terri­
tories within lIstrategicll areas and those in "non-strategic" 
1 
areas. Other senators made casual statements in support of 
trusteeship, but none of them added any real sUbstance to 
the co~~ents made by Connally, nor did they choose to elabo­
rate on the methods by which this mechanism would be imple­
mented by the United Nations. 
Collective security ~ ~ promoter of peace. As a 
last resort, the Security Council was expected to rely on 
the collective force of its member states to repel a threat 
of aggression. If the other mechanisms for peace (i.e., 
pacific settlement, judicial settlement, trusteeship, 
debate, and functionalism) proved inadequate, it would 
obviously become necessary for the United Nations to C01:1­
front force with force. The term "collective security, II all 
agreed, implied a firm commitment by members of the United 
Nations to collectively uphold the security of the world by 
confronting an aggressor with a unified force. 
As noted in a previous chapter, the senators dis­
agreed sharply about the application and extent of such col­
lective action. r'lost, however, felt that such a tool tvas 
1 bid. 
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essential if the United Nations were to avoid the impotence 
of its predecessor, the League of Nations. As Senator 
Barkley put it, the League failed primarily because lIit 
could adjUdicate and render decisions but nad no organized 
1force with which to enforce its decrees.1! Ris colleagues 
agreed. 
Senator Fulbright lauded the potential of collective 
security as the principal deterrent against aggression. He 
pointed out that most previous wars had been the result of 
an aggressor underestimating the will of peaceful nations. 
He said that most democratic nations had waited for an overt 
act of aggression before reacting with force; by this time, 
of course, it was too late and there was no honorable alter­
native to war. Unfortunately, the aggressor all too often 
mistook neutrality or nonintervention for cowardice, and war 
then ensued. He felt likeWise that an international armed 
force would act as a preventive deterrent capable of eliminat­
2 
ing all but a few isolated minor cases of aggression. FUl­
brir.r,ht concluded 11. I believe that by adopting the prin­
clple of compulsion and the principle of the preventiveness 
of that compulsion, this Charter is on the right road to 
3peace." 
Senator Burton conceded that collective security 
1 
Ibid., Part 6, '7992. 
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would be an effective deterrent against war, and he particu­
larly emphasized the imperative need for United States par­
ticipation. without it, he believed that the United 
Nations would have no real enforcement power and no chance 
of repelling aggression. 
Senator Eastland suggested that an international 
peace force should prevent even the great powers from start­
ing war. He stated that the great powers were aware that no 
one nation could defeat a combined force of all the other 
nations of the world. He recognized that the great powers 
could exercise their veto privilege to block any reco~mended 
action against them, but he pointed out that world opinion 
would surely reinforce the potential of collective action. 
A great power, he felt, would not dare to be a brazen 
aggressor, since the members of the United Nations would 
condemn all acts of aggression and demand remedial action. 
The aggressor would therefore stand gUilty before the eyes 
of the world and public condemnation, along With the 
potential for mobilizing the resources of the member 
- 1 
nations, would act as a powerful deterrent. 
Senator Lucas also favored the concept of collective 
security and tried to dispel fear on the part of some of his 
colleagues that a collective force might someday be used 
against the United States. He said that such action (/Yould 
1 
Ibid., rart 6, 05· 
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not be possible under the Charter provisions, for the United 
States reserved the right to veto any recommended action 
1
against itself. 
Senator Vandenberg best represented the view of the 
Senate majority regarding the principle of collective 
security. He said he hoped that it would never have to be 
resorted to. He also said that he had faith in the power of 
functionalism and pacific settlement to forestall the use of 
force. Nevertheless, he felt that collective security was a 
vital safety valve because, if necessary, it unquestionably 
could maintain peace. He emphasized further that the 
eXistence of an international peace force and our contribu­
tions thereto would not detract from the United States pre­
rogative of maintaining an invincible domestic army and 
navy. Therefore, there would be no infringement on American 
2 
sovereignty. 
III. Tflli II10RAL AFiGUHE:NT 
Among the strongest arguments advanced by the propo­
nents to justify our joining the United Nations was the 
mora1 argumen.t .ilj'ost of the senators seemed to feel that 
the Senate after World War I had made a drastic mistake in 
re ject il1,\1; the League t and that this re ject ion had been a key 
factor in the SUbsequent ineffectiveness of that organiza­
'"' lbo' l)art 5.,c.,. le1 ••lIbid •• d031. 
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tion. ~~en the most pragmatic arguments concerning the 
prospective effectiveness of the United Nations were laden 
with many idealistic and emotional appeals concerning the 
ethical obligation of the United States to join. These 
arguments were qUite in keeping with the times. The nation 
was weary of war and public opinion overwhelmingly supported 
the creation of the United Nations. As a resUlt, it appeared 
to most senators that it would be political suicide to come 
out against the Charter. For these and other reasons, all 
but the most intransigent opponents of the Charter felt com­
pelled to speak in moralistic superlatives about the goals 
and ideals of the Charter. Clearly they hoped in this way 
to find favor with their constituents. 
The most frequent moral argument stressed the fact 
that the United states had an obligation to join the United 
Nat ions because it \'1as a "last hope II and because there "\,ras 
nothin,-'2; to lose. II No Senator ventured to predict that the 
Charter ,['-TonId guarantee a future wholly free from the 
rava~es of war, but the prevailing view among the senators 
was that it offered a very good chance of avoiding a future 
world catastrophe. For example. Senator Sdwin Johnson (D., 
Col.) stated that technological developments had reached the 
point where world annihilation was possible should there 
ever be a liJorld l.jar III. He therefore felt that the ever­
t ncreasln[s cornplexi ty and interdependence of twrld affairs. 
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alons with this clear technological threat, made it abso­
lutely imperative that the United States join the United 
1Nations as a last effort to prevent another war. He said: 
"I should rather be burned at the stake than assume any 
responsibility for not taking every possible precaution 
against the occurrence of ~!orld War III. ,,2 
Senator Ernest McFarland (D., Ariz.) added to 
Johnson's remarks by pointing out that the threat of World 
War III still existed. He said that though German rnilitar­
ism was on the brink of defeat, the main causes of war still 
existed: poverty, boundary disputes, economic rivalries, 
and international misunderstanding. To be sure, the Charter 
was not a panacea for peace, but it was an honest attempt in 
that direction. It prOVided a formula for peace that was 
evolved by fifty nations, and. thus the United States had a 
moral obligation not only to join the United Nations, but 
3
also to work avidly in its behalf. 
Senator Burnet Maybank (D., S.C.) warned that the 
Charter must not be rejected unless a better alternative was 
proposed. He said that to oppose the Charter and offer 
nothing better in its place was a totally negative and 
pessimistic approach. 8xperience had shown him that that 
the old balance-of-pm>Jer system did not result in peace but 
21 Ibid., 8004.Ibid., Part 6, R003. 
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in war. Furthermore, he argued that it would be sheer folly 
to resort to suoh an approaoh onoe again. All the past 
plans and sohemes for preventing war had ended in failure, 
so there was no other alternative now but to aooept and 
1implement the Charter. 
It was emphasized by several senators that the United 
States should take the initiative in ratifying the Charter 
in order to lend credibility and prestige to its oause. 
Senator Connally for one argued that the Senate ought to 
ratify the Charter expeditiously so that the world would 
know of American convictions and follow o~ example. He 
said: "~ie leagued our armed might for war. Now let us 
. 2league our moral and material m1.ght for peace." 
It was likewise pointed out by the Charter's propo­
nents that the Senate had a moral obligation to ratify the 
Charter out of respect for the hopes and dreams of the 
American public and the other peoples of the world. Senator 
fnbert Thomas (D., Utah) meticulously traced the evolution 
of &~erloan sentiment for the Charter, reminding the Senate 
of the spiteful defeat of vloodrow tHlson' s "dream" and the 
3 
horrors experienced during the two world wars. Senator 
Elmer Thomas (D., Okl.) added that he had not received a 
single letter from the people of Oklahoma that did not favor 
2 
Ibid., Part 5. 6878. 
1 ~Ibld., Part 6, 8097. 
"1'.;_-----­
- ~:-: 
_ 
72 
1United states membership in the United Nations. 
Thus, the Charter proponents skillfully blended their 
moral and practical arguments in such a fashion that it was 
exceedingly difficult for their adversaries to refute them. 
Their arguments stressed the practical reasons why the 
structure of the United Nations provided a rational and 
basically pragmatic approach to peace. The practical argu­
ments were constantly reinforced by the emotional pleas, 
stressing the devastation of past wars, the defeat of 
Wilson's dream, the historical similarity between the Charter 
and the American Constitution, and, finally, the moral 
obligation of the Senate to fulfill the hopes and asplra­
tions of the American people. Perhaps some of the senators 
displayed an exaggerated degree of emotionalism, but one 
should not assume today that their ardor was insincere. 
Though such enthusiasm was not based on a belief that the 
United Nations would be a panacea for all future strife, the 
Senate majority was clearly convinced that the organization 
offered at least the hope of a viable alternative to the 
ineffectual past efforts at preventing or containing war. 
That was not exactly a wildly Utopian hope. 
1_ t.lL)ld. , (3168 ~ 
CHAPTER IV
 
CHIEF OPPOSITION ARGUrlliNTS
 
With a few notable exceptions, the senators who spoke 
appeared reluctant to voice opposition to, or even reserva­
tions about the Charter. It would appear that the majority 
of them were intimidated by the infectious enthusiasm of 
their colleagues and by the strong indications of mass 
public support for the United Nations. 
Only Senators Langer and Shipstead voted against rat­
ification of the Charter (although Senator Johnson of Cali­
fornia, who was absent from the Chamber due to illness, also 
1indicated that he would have voted against it). Today, 
Nhen the final vote of eighty-nine for and two against is 
considered out of context, it is deceiving, for it does not 
reflect the true sentiments of the Sen~te at the time. 
Senators C. wayland Brooks (H., Ill.). Harlan J. Bushfield 
(H., S.D.) and Burton \·lheeler (D., l'iont.) for example, were 
clooely aligned With Senators Langer and Shlpstead in their 
general Views. These senators were inclined to oppose the 
United Nations on three general principles. First, they 
believed that it tllaS a basic infri ngement on Un! ted States 
sovereignty and was therefore unconstitutional. Second, 
they contend.ed that it would entanp;le the Un! ted States in 
1 
Ibid. ; 8190. 
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foreign conflicts which were irrelevant and contrary to our 
national interest. Such entanglement, they said, would 
inevitably lead to involvement in a world war. And third, 
they suggested that the United Nations was a diabolical 
scheme devised by conspiring individuals, mostly wealthy 
Easterners who hoped to reap the economic profits from 
Amerioan involvement in foreign wars at the expense of the 
IIcommon man. II 
Another faction of senators could best be described 
as "semi-opponents. II 'rhese indiViduals T,I)'ere extremely 
skeptical about the workability of the Charter and were 
someWhat cynical of its avo\'led goals. They were not true 
opponents, however, because although they expressed reserva­
tiona about specific Charter provisions or objectives, they 
did not express outright opposition to the Charter. Many of 
these semi-opponents indicated that they would vote for the 
Charter because it was well-intentioned, and, in a~s case, 
there were no better alternatives available; yet they 
admitted to being skeptical of its viability. These 
senators' Views were most often revealed durip~ those por­
tions of the debate which covered the controversial sec­
tions of the Charter. Their opinions concer-nin.'S such sec­
tions often correlat with the views of the Charter oppo­
nents. 
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I. UTOPIANISM OF SUPPORTERS 
Severa1 of the opponents leveled charges of ""naive 
utopiani8Ju" against the Charter's proponents, w'hlle others 
intimated the same by pointing out the unfeasibility of the 
Charter's various mechanisms for preserving the peace. In 
fact, this was the underlying theme of practically every 
attack launched against the Charter by the opponents: that 
the ideals embodied therein were noble, but that they 
promised an unattainable Utopian world of perpetual peace 
and felicity. It was charged that as a result, the United 
\ I; 
States would be lulled into a false sense of security that 
would pose as a serious threat to its safety. 
Senator lIIheeler commended Senator Lister Hill (D., 
Ala.) on the eloquence of an emotion-laden speech he had 
made in support of the Charter, but charged him v.Ji th 
II vJ hlstling in the dark." l'lheeler sald that it was fantasy 
to talk of future tranquillity under the guidance of the 
United Nations ~'1hen the "chaos in Europe is tragic beyond 
description,lI and the "ineVitable triumph of disease, 
starvation, and frustration already challe~~es the sanity of 
1."'-'e Vl._. III ti,_ accus ed Am-Arl' ca of idealistically judging; all then"".L u _ 
other countries of the world by the same high principles and 
11ceas1 he Id. b_y i t sown Cl'zeno."tt ~ He said that to anticiDate 
1
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a new reign of international order and justice under law was 
inconsistent with the harsh lessons of the past. He felt 
that the Charter was nothing more than a dream which ignored 
reality. He concluded that those senators who refused to 
believe that brute force, and not mutual trust and coopera­
tion among nations, would dictate the fate of the world were 
1gravely deluding themselves as well as the American public. 
Senator Shipstead argued that the United Nations 
would be incapable of ensuring peace in a world still 
governed by power politics. He cited the creation of the 
Security Council as eVidence of his contention that the 
great powers were already concerned with inflicting the 
spoils of war on the vanquished and the weaker nations of 
the world. He intimated that those senators who envisioned 
a world governed by a code of international law were ignor­
in~ the stark realities inherent in traditional power 
politics. In short, he believed that it was folly to sup­
port the United Nations as an egalitarian organization 
possessed with altruistic motives, since all signs pointed 
towards a postwar era that would be characterized by ruth­
less power struggles. 
II. Di~B'i!:CT3 OF T UNIT3D NATIONS AS A PR0I"1O'rliH OF F~ACE~: 
The Charter opponents devoted only a small fraction 
lIbld.. '?9th Con~o;ress. 79C1 5. 
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to the struc­
organization as a promoter of peace. 
of their arguments against the United Nations 
tural defects of the 
They were apparently content to talk about the Utopianism of 
the proponents Without dissecting the various mechanisms for 
peace as delineated in the Charter. As preViously discussed 
in Chapter II, there were many interpretative questions and 
reservations expressed about the Charter's provisions: how­
ever, only a few senators transcended this type of skepti­
cism with outright opposition to the Charter's machinery for 
promoting peace. 1£ 
I 
The avowed opponents alleged that the gravest inflrmi­
ties were contained in the Security Council's role in 
pacific settlement, the great power veto, and collective 
security. Senator Shipstead labeled the Council as a dicta­
torship of the Big Five that would maintain peace by force. 
He asked, liDo we want that kind of 'tlOrld government? III 
Senator Langer said that those senators who compared the 
Charter to the United States Constitution overlooked a fun­
damental difference: the Constitution guaranteed the 
equality of the states; the Charter allowed several states 
to have a veto power over the rest. He said that had such 
an organization been in existence when America was strug~li~s 
for independence. it would have been impossible for france 
or \ coun t t 0 ffer. assistnl'cea.· • For thisany otner ry 0 'L ~ reason. 
11·
_b:t.'d ., Part 12, A29?8. 
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he predicted that the Security Council would act to perpetu­
1
ate an unjust status quo in many parts of the world. 
Senator Shipstead feared that the Security Council 
would be a projection of the War Alliance and would encourage 
bellicosity through the mass production of armaments which 
could be used capriciously against the smaller nations of 
the world to preserve the interests of the Big Five. He 
said that the Charter had failed to pspell out those 
instances in which it was permissible to use force--that no 
attempt had been made to clearly define "aggression" in such 
2 
a manner that force could not be used arbitrarily. He went 
on to say 1I1:lould it not be a grievous embarrassment for the 
~merican people to find themselves suppressing rebellion 
3
against tyranny allover the tororld?" He concluded that the 
fallacy of collective security	 lay in the fact th~t peace 
4 
must be enforced by l'1agin-S war. 
Senator Styles Bridges (R., N.H.), a reluctant sup­
porter of the United Nations, also condemned the structure 
of the Security Council. He believed that the threat of 
dorld iJar III lay in the tensions and disagreements amOrlt'"<; 
the Bi~ Five in SQrope and Asia. He reasoned that since the 
Five l'11'ere precisely those nations favored by the 
it wau1 , h_e 11 1e for anyone of them to blockCharter, Q pOSS_J_ 
? 
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any actlon against themselves through their exercise of../ the 
veto. He pointed out that within recent months the British 
had curbed French policy in Syria and the United States had 
done the same in regard to Titars ambitions and Russian 
policy in the Trieste area. Had the Security Council been 
in existence under the veto rule, he said, these acts would 
I 
have been impossible. 
Senator Bridges also argued that the Security Council 
was only designed to arrest acts of aggression by small 
nations that were incapable of fomenting war on a large 
scale. He said that: 
The menace of large-scale conflict does not reside 
in quarrels of small countries by themselves. Such 
quarrels can be limited and isolated•••• The 
preventive machinery works smoothly until the point 
of real danger is reached, the point where a nation 
strong enough to precipitate a world war 1s 
involved, and then it can go dead. 2 
Furthermore, he felt that the Council would be ineffective 
in handling small power aggression, since the small powers 
would align with a great power for security and assurance of 
Jimmunity from United Nations action. 
Senator Taft maintained that the veto power of the 
Big Five cl1an..ged the Hhole nature of the United Nations by 
makiD.ts it a lIconsultino; body" that lflas incapable of exertinrJ: 
any real authority a~ain8t the chief threat to world 
? 
~ Ibid.II"
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security, the great powers themselves. He also stated that 
the means of pacific settlement provided in the Charter were 
useless unless backed up by the potential of enforcement. 
He said it was his opinion that pacific settlement had 
failed to remove any threats of war in the past. Chamber­
lain, for example, had conferred at length with Hitler and 
thought that he was making progress. Hull did the same With 
1the Japanese delegates. 
Sxcept for criticisms directed at the Security 
Council, little was said by the opponents about the possible 
operational weaknesses of the United Nations. While a great 
deal of debate focused on the interpretation of the various 
provisions (discussed in Ch~pter II), this dialogue, when 
negative, was in the form of reservations by the proponents. 
A close examination of the debate reveals that the sparse 
criticism that was leveled at the structural machinery of 
the United Nations was usually negative only in the sense 
that the Cr~rter proponents felt that the United Nations 
should be more forceful in some particular area. For 
example. senator Fepper contended that the trusteeship con­
cept as enumerated in the Charter did noth1n~ to assure the 
SUbject peoples of the world of di~n1ty and freedom. as 
there were no rules or timetable which would compel the 
1 
Ibid.. 8153. 
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colonists to abdicate their control. 1 In this respect, 
Senator Morse criticized the International Court of Justice 
for not asserting mandatory jurisdiction over disputes. 2 
The Charter opponents chose to relate their criticisms 
of the United Nations chiefly to its effect on American 
sovereignty, with secondary empr~sis on the economic disad­
vantages to the United states and on the fact that it was 
the brainchild of "sinister ll propagandists. rrhey appa.rently 
believed that if they were going to muster any substantial 
support for their position, they must resort to scare 
tactics instead of expending their efforts on discussion of 
the unworkability of the Charter agencies. 
III. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CFJL~TER 
The strongest objections voiced by the opponents 
centered around the issue of United States sovereignty vis 
a 
I 
vis the United Nations. The contention of the hard-core 
opponents was that if the United States joined the United 
Nations, it would be a case of unconstitutionally surrender­
iQ~ our destiny to a world government and committing our 
troops and economic resources to opportunist nations, With 
the probable outcome bei~~ involvement in another catastrophic 
war. Langer and Shipstead. the two admitted opponents, were 
," ~nators hT11ee' eY" ;:::.~us hf; e 1d bsupported on these po i n t s,y :Jc; - ,,- ~. ' .' - - • 
lIbid.. [)O?2. 
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and Brooks, who expressed similar views but finally voted 
for the Charter because they felt it offered a remote flicker 
of hope. 
The crux of the opposition's reasoning was that the 
Charter authorized the Executive Branch, either by way of 
the President or his delegate on the Security Council, to 
commit United States troops to a supra-national organization 
in clear violation of the Constitution. It was argued that 
such a commitment would inevitably lead to United States 
involvement in a third world war. Senator Shipstead charged 
that the Executive Branch's co~~ltment of United States 
troops to the United Nations would result in 
• • • the loss of our representative form of govern­
ment here at home and the emergence of a collective 
¥ascist state in our midst where the Government has 
been completely divorced from and rendered un~ccount­
able to the people's sovereignty.l 
rle believed that sUch a cotlL'11i tment N'ould set in motion the 
very forces which America fOQght through World War II to 
eliminate. The country would be dragged into a bloody 
struggle for world power--a shoWdown between the Bastern and 
(/estern Hemispheres that could very \'1el1 end in the destruc­
t· f' vi Ii ti on H·e nrz.ued that the nations of BuropevlOD 0 C1 za • ~ ~6 
,naa, areacylIdmove'ot th.e left and Nere becoming increasiM; l;V.
 
H d 'th "it II' He fe,Slred that if the United States
B_ ~ p; 11 e . ioV1. :J an. 
jotned the United Nations. we. too, t'J'ould become a part of 
1
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the trend. The only alternative, he said. was to resist 
despotism and remain independently strong. Finally, he 
argued. that allowing the United States delegate to sit on 
the Security Council with the power to commit United states 
troops would be clearly contrary to our constitutional 
representative government. l 
Senator Shipstead pointed out that the United States 
delegate would be endowed With totalitarian powers. and he 
insisted that this was a critical matter, not just a case of 
"constitutional hair-splitting." He complained that the 
~xecutlve Branch had already unnecessarily involved the 
2United States in the last t~",o "{orld Wars. 
Senator Langer agreed with Shipstead that the United 
states could not legally join the United Nations. He relied 
heaVily on anti-United Nations testimony given before the 
Foreign Helatlons Committee and on articles from periodicals 
which opposed the United Nations. For example. he requested 
that the testimony of Ers. Catherine P. Baldwin of Net-v York 
City, a houseNife \liho described herself as an "f-unerican 
vJoman, a mot her, and a grandmother. It be printed in the 
Hecord to support his views. 3 i'11'S. Bald~'iin had testified 
that the Ch~rter was opposed to our Constitution and to 
everythino; Amerlcsns were Sl'JOrn to uphold. She believed 
2 
l Ibid •• d121-H323. Ibid .• 8122 . 
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that the United Nations was a "direct attempt to sabatoge 
the Constitution of the United states, to take away our 
sovereign rights." She further stated that the Charter 
advocated a IJdemagogiC, oligarchic project" by permitting 
five men to sit on the Security Council and determine the 
l
ultimate destiny of the United states. In fact, she said 
the Charter was nothing more than an instrument of war. and 
thus those senators who voted for its ratification would go 
down in history as betrayers of their country. In her 
opinion the only legitimate way for the Charter to be con­
stitutionally adopted would be to submit it to the voters of 
j.the country as an amendment to the Federal constitution. 2 
F 
One of the commonest arguments advanced by Langer and I 
Shipstead was the charge that the United states was ignoring 
the true will of the American people by rushing the Charter 
through the Senate. They believed that the real pulse of 
the nation was not recognized by the Senate. Senator Langer 
suggested that the majority of his colleagues were sacrific­
i~" their moral scruples to ride on a temporary wave of 
specious public enthusiasm that had been lTI.8.nipulated by 
clever propagandists. He noted that five years earlier he 
had promised the citizens of North Dakota that he would 
never vote to send United states troops to fight in Surope, 
but lIJould spend every last dollar in our treasury to defend 
21 Ibid .• AJ655.Ibid. 
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the Afestern Hemisphere. He said in this regard: 
Having 80 pledged ~yselft and having been elected 
to my senatorship upon such a pledge, and not having 
been elected to create an organization to which we 
would give promise, either express or implied, that 
it would have authority to send our boyslall over 
the earth, I cannot support the Charter. 
Langer went on to remind the Senate that eleven million of 
our fightin~ men and women were still outside of the United 
States, and he felt that the Senate had a moral obligation 
to hear their views. For him, they constituted the very 
2
"backbone of the common people of America." He also agreed 
with ~~s. Baldwin's testimony in regard to the necessity of 
referring the question of ratification to the &~erican 
people, and he mentioned that any Senate action to the oon­
trary would surely constitute a betrayal of the principles 
J 
set forth in our Constitution. 
Senators Langer, Shipstead, and Bushfield all felt 
that the Charter placed an unconstitutional imposition on 
the sovereign pre~mlnence of regional agreements. While 
I 
these senators were isolationists vis ~ ~ the Old World, 
they were willing to protect the Americans from outside 
interference by vrhatever means necessary. They all rsenuinely 
feared that the Charter would undermine the validity of our 
basic refc;~ional comrnitments, particularly the I'lonroe Doctrine. 
? 
1 , . ~ ~Ib1d.
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Senator Bushfield, indeed, contended that the only effective 
and valid means of insuring peace lay along regional lines. 
He feared that a United Nations armed force purporting to 
act as a world police force would involve the member states 
in total war the first time it crossed any nation's boundary. 
On the other hand, he argued that regional ~~reements would 
commit only those nations that were geographically close to 
the conflict, thus avoiding international involvement. He 
mentioned also that under the Charter any proposed regional 
agreements must meet With the approval of the Security 
Council. He was worried that: 
If that proposal U3ecuri ty Council approval of all 
regional agreements) be insisted upon, the I1onroe 
Doctrine, Which has kept the Western Hemisphere free 
from invasion and aggression for more than a century, 
will be thrown out the Window. America does not want 
the i',OT1.TOe Doctrine junked. l 
He was convinced that United States troop commitments should 
be pledged solely to uphold the principles espoused by the 
l'ionroe Doctrine. Finally, as a Viable alternative to the 
United Nations system of collective security, he proposed 
that the United states endeavor to build a beefed-llp 
regional defense organization along the lines of the Pan 
:2American Union. 
1\1 • C:CONOIViIC DISAD\lANTAG~S TO THE UNI'l'SD STA'l' 
[he avoi<Ted Charter opponents ;~·ere aided in their 
21 ., '19th 
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attacks on the economic disadvantages of the Charter by a 
group of senators lATho can best be described as "economic 
isolati onists. II 'rhese senators favored the principles and 
machinery of the Charter provided the United Nations did not 
try to dictate United states economic policy or require us 
to expend more than a fair and proportionate share of the 
cost for supporting the organization's work. 
Senator Taft feared that if the Reciprocal Trade 
Asreements Act and Bretton woods Agreements were incorporated 
into the United Nations, the result would be a Hone-way 
street, in which we contribute everything and nobody else 
contributes anything. • •• III He felt that economic prob­
lems could best be solved by allol'Jing each nation to evalu­
ate its own needs and resources and then make appropriate 
bilateral agreements. He stated that if the United States 
Wished to rehabilitate Europe, this could be most effec= 
tively accomplished through an fu~erican relief organization 
and an I~xport-Import Bank. He thought Iittle of the Un! ted 
[-rat iOns Heli ef and 1l.ehabi Ii ta t ion Admtnistrati on. He ('lent 
so far as to describe the Bretton ~voods Agreements and 
Heci procal Trade itgreements as simply "economic foolish­
;(ness.l!~ 
"1 ,';P....l)e··hcrt (11.. Ind.) was equally concerned aboutJ"lomer _''''. c u, 
clralnll1p; rT. "'I' teo (''' .. ,t~ne ' , , of \JU ~l ",·)··.'tate..<:!~ ).I'I()nles throUf,-,.;h the Uni ted 
1 , "'1'1:. 3154- E3155.b i Cl.. Cl 5.J. 
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Nations. He said:
 
• • • r \ATish to ask where are we to get the money 
(for the United Nations) and when will we stop going 
into debt, and what is the virtue on our part, if I 
may say so, in bragging about the fact that we have 
gone into debt and have had an unbalanced budget for14 years?l 
Capehart said that he would not vote for any expenditures to 
aid the Bretton Woods Proposals or the Reciprocal Trade 
11greement until this qUestion had been sufficiently answered. 2 
Senator Thomas Hart (D., Conn.), a solid Charter sup­
porter, also warned that the United states must avoid over­
extending her financial and material co~mitments to the 
United Nations. He noted that the other nations of the 
world were presently relying on the United States for aid 
and security because of our altruistic nature and military 
strength. He feared that the United Nations would seriously 
deplete United States strength, and he emphasized that 
,American resources ~~ere not inexhaustible. He also said 
that our Th~tlonal interest superceded any internation~l 
interest, and it was therefore imperative that the United 
States maintain economic and military strength at home 
before extending benevolent promises to the other nations of 
3the t'1orld. 
Senator Raymond lHllls (H., Ind.) argued that federal 
21 Ibid.IbJd ., 7570. 
1 
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funds should generally be reserved for domestic purposes. 
Not surprisingly, he described United States contributions 
to international organizations as "amazing and outlandish 
Federal expend1tures. III He said in this regard: 
If we believe in this American system, how can we 
continue to preserve it if our manufactured products, 
our machinery, our raw materials, our foodstuffs, 
plus billions of dollars--all needed here at home-­
are used to make the communistic and socialistic 
systems of Europe seem successful while we break 
the capitalistic system at home. 2 
Senator James Eastland (D., Miss.) shared Senator 
willis' concern over our subsidizing other governments, par­
ticularly the communist ones. He said that much of the 
money to be advanced to rehabilitate Europe would fall under 
the general reach of the Charter. He had grave misgivings 
about the deteriorating situation in southern and eastern 
C:;urope, and he said: if Let me make crystal clear, [{ir. 
President, that America's resources must not be spent to 
.~ 11.3promote communism in t:urope. 
Senator Bevercomb expressed concern that the United 
states might commit troops and resources to the United 
Nations at the expense of our domestic army and navy. He 
warned that under no condition should the government decide 
to reduce the size of our armed forces, for the key to peace 
4 
an.ld seour i ~ vy l·.ay· in tl18 stre~g.th"'<: of the military. 
21 Ibid.d. • 1 
-
4- Ibid. I E3040. 
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As was to be expected, Senators Langer and Shipstead 
took the most pessimistic view of the United States finan­
cial obligations to the United Nations. They asserted that 
such expenditures would mean the eventual downfall of the 
nation. In this respect, Senator Shipstead said: 
Mr. President, I wonder if any Member of the 
Senate body honestly believes that the average 
American citizen has even the slightest notion of 
the extent to which we are involved in a financial 
race with disaster ••• we are co~mittlng ourselves 
to economic and financial undertaking which would 1 
bring the Whole world crashing down upon our heads. 
He added that if our production should come under world con­
trol, arbitrary standards would ineVitably be imposed. 
Foreign-owned corporations would flood the American media 
with political propaganda and deduct the cost as an a~ver~ 
tisine; expense. A "collective economic state," he felt, 
would slowly undermine those values and virtues endemic to 
2America. His pessimism was deep indeed. 
ND THE UNIT~D NATI SIHACY 
Senators Lanes er. Shlpst ead , and. to an extent .F3ush~ 
field and ~heeler alleged that the support which had been 
ralliecl behind the United Nations Nas largely the result of 
·thl the United States anda plot by subversive eleraent s vJl , n " 
,-, t a. '.i'l.,·1 American public
,::-1 br oaci e They maintained t.ath th- e oena e ~ ­
had really been deluded into supportinc; the Organization
 
'"> '~Il)id", d12001-'<"·" ~ '1lDld., H,19. 
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clever propaganda from these sources. They predicted that 
the United States might well fall victim to a sinister con­
spiracy one day if we supported this scheme. 
'Ih~ foreigp consPirac~. Although Senators Langer and 
Wheeler did not explicitly state that the Charter was the 
brainchild of foreign conspirators, their dialogue implied a 
strong suspicion to this effect. In fact. they sUbscribed 
to the view that all European nations were ruled by totali­
tarian tyrants who wished to bring the United States under 
the wing of their treachery. And they felt such efforts 
would continue. 
Senator Wheeler regretted that United states morale 
h8d already been affected by the influence of foreign propa­
r;;andists. He stated that the natiol1s of E~urope would like 
nothin!~; better than to see the United States embroiled in 
their perpetual pm'!er struggles. He deplored the fact that 
• • • the America in 1:1h10h I live is no longer 
afrald of totali tar ian tyrann~y. It openly embraces 
what 0ceSident Roosevelt declared to be a dictator­
ship as absolute as any in the world [.e.~ the 
hlarrin:~ condition of fSurop§J. Ae gaze fOl1 ljl:v upon 
it and nroudlv arro~ate to ourselves the right to
• - - .,. OJ '_.-' join such select c()'npany. 
firr. fre,::;ident, all I have to say to the AJner~ca~ 
people Is that if. as our contemporar! N'?lf pacJ: 0._ 
orop!3J~nmUsts is attemptinG; to prove by Its y;ppi;lz'Y" 
the· si Ie statement of historical facts and AmerIcan 
princiules and ideas 1s divisive, destructive, or 
sUbver~ive to American interests, then America as 
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a nation of free peoples is already blindly groping
toward her doom. 1 
He went on to assert that past American assistance to 
Surope, particularly to Britain, had been the primary cause 
of ~~erican involvement in World Wars I and II. It was his 
view that the repeal of the Neutrality Act, the cash-and­
carry provisions, the destroyer-bases deal, the Selective 
Service Act, the convoys-to-Britain. and lend-lease had all 
led to United states involvement in these lrlars. He also 
intimated that European endorsement of the United Nations 
was based on the same motive as their acceptance of past 
United states aid: the involvement of the United States in 
their struggles for the purpose of securing military and 
2
economic assistance. Wheeler called the temporary unity of 
the Un! ted States t Great 3rt taint and B.ussia an "interna­
tional shotgun I'Teddlng ll and warned of the vicious hypocrisy 
3 
and chicanery behind this guise of unity. He quoted an 
information bulletin of the Soviet 5mbassy printed in late 
1944 which pretended to honor the sovereign rights of the 
nations of i~urope, and he then. listed a series of aggressive 
acts which had been co~mitted on the smaller nations of 
Lt 
eastern and southern. Europe as eVidence of Soviet duplicity. 
:Jhee1er sa1d that most Am.ericans made the mistake of 
~ ? 
cl. Ibiq.Ibid., 7973. 
I.J. 
Ibid •• '7977.J 1bid .• ?:nfL 
93 
jud~ing all other countries of the world by the same high 
ideals and principles which all Americans hold to be true. 
He stressed that most of the peoples of Europe and Asia did 
not even know what democracy means. It was therefore easy 
for the public to overlook the potential pitfalls of the 
1 
United Nations. Moreover, he said that it was natural for 
Russia to endorse the United Nations and United States 
membership therein since this would lend legitimacy to their 
aggressions. He abhorred their behavior in East Europe and 
said that after the Senate had ratified the Charter, it 
would be saying to Russia, in effect, "You can do practically 
anything you want to with those countries over there. II 2 He 
wanted to be no part of that. 
Senator Langer agreed with wheeler that the Charter 
would promote the selfish and aggressive tendencies of the 
great powers at the expense of liberty. He believed that 
the oppressed people of the world, from Foland to India, 
would be sentenced to permanent enslavement because the 
Charter would uphold the interests of the imperial COUD­
:3
tries. rhls he could not condone. 
Senator Shipstead asked if it was not possible that 
t ' ne 'T'l,nlted Nat·lons was a s~he·~ m·e on- the c-_part of the Bip; Three -
(Russia, Britain, and the United States) to perpetuate the 
21 
--
Ibid •• 79920Ibid .• 79F37. 
d. • 1 ~-
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injustices of the Versailles Treaty by "mobilizing the armed 
might of the world • • • only to grind into finer dust the 
reeking ruins of prostrate peoples." He went on to suggest 
that the Charter was no more than a facade to project into 
peacetime the wartime alliance of the Allied Powers. l 
I'he domestic plot. The opponents found the domestic 
Ilplot" more easily identifiable and definable than the 
alleged foreign conspiracy. Thus, they pointed their 
fin~ers at a specific class of individuals as the culprits 
behind the wave of pro-UN propaganda that was sweepin~ the 
nation, and described the sinister motives which presumably 
prompted such individuals to support the Charter. Their 
"conspiracy theory of history" ~Tas quite involved. 
Senator Langer accused the big financiers of con­
spiring to embroil the United States in another war through 
the United Nations under the pretense of protectin~ the 
peace. He alleged that the affairs of the country t'Tere in 
fact beir1JS run by about sixty I'lealthy families who con­
') 
T'f!!=ltrolled· t·h~. cruet causes of IN •• r--tJ'1,e• cartels and monopolies.·~ -
He identifi some of these lIwa.rmon':r,ers" in a speech he 
clellvered to the Sena.te on June 20: 
••• President Truman stlll has the same Department 
of State as had President Roosevelt. Stettlnius, of 
the House of orQ:an, former chairman of United States 
2Tbid • Pa.rt II, A26J5.J. ~ ~lIbid., 11. • 
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Steel, f~nancial czar extraordinary, still rules. 
On his rlght hand we have Nelson Rockefeller, who 
1s universally hated by the common people allover 
Mexico and South America. On his left hand we have 
Clayton, the greatest cotton gambler in the world, 
whose 1n~erests are not in the United States only 
but who nas branch offices in Mexico, Peru, Argentina, 
raraguay, Brazil, and Egypt at the present time, and 
who testified that the capital surplus and undivided 
profits of his company were a little over :j~50,OOO,OOO, 
and that he was doing business in Russia at the very 
time when our Government did not recognize Russia 
and that he did business with Germany and Japan
before the ~lar. 
Then the President also has Secretary of war 
Stimson, who did everything he could to get us into 
this war While still a member of one of the largest 
corporation firms in New York City; and then we have 
Forrestall, a New Yorker, head of the Navy.l 
Furthermore he contended that the interests of these were 
alien to those of the common man. that they did not under­
stand the problems or concerns of the masses and had, "never 
milked a covj , II or "'worked a single day tIlth their hands as 
2 
day laborers. II He concluded that men such as these \'1ere 
not only unsympathetic to the dreams of the cammon man, but 
even manl pula ted the Yrl.tlsses for profit. The common people 
of the Uni ted States. he said, were expected to shed the 
blood of war so that men sl1ch as these cOllld reap the 
, 3pecuniary rewaras. 
Senator ifJheeler agreed I-Jl th Langer, sayin~:: 
••• ;\.merica is beil1,'t used to build up a ne1.1 lwrld 
s gls between two ~reat imperialistic nations 
2 
T cl.,1-.~..J1 1 \01.(1., inrt 5. 6332 . hi·­
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the United States and Hussia , a struggle fo"!" 1i'JOrld 
trad:, world ma:kets, wor~d resouroes, world power, 
and world dominlon, in WhlOh again we shall be called 
upon to pour out what is left of our once vast store­
houses of treasure, raw materials, and of blood. l 
'~ut, unlike Langer, \tlheeler failed to identify those indiv­
iduals for Ivhom Amer ica was IIbeing used II to create a t-'1orld 
pm<fer struggle t'lith Russia. However, his past references to 
Ilprominent wealthy Easterners" implied a belief that they 
were the ones behind such a nefarious scheme. 
'I'he opponents did not attempt to bring forth empirioal 
evidence of the manner in 1'J'hich the propagandists had 
rallied support for the United Nations; their intuition 
apparently was the basis of their suspicions. AlthOUgh 
Langer did attempt to identify particular individuals who 
VIere allegedly behind the propaganda, 'liheeler, Bushfield, and 
Shlpstead preferred to limit their accusations to the 
wealthy Eastern class as a whole. There was no mention made 
by the opponents of the historioal exigenoies which might 
have influenoed the American publiO in adoptin~ a favorable 
vlehl' of the United Nations. Clearly they preferred visceral 
passions over reason, and they felt that if they could 
implicate the wealthy elite of fuT.erioa as the conspirators 
o f U" l\ d they" mi~ht bepro- 1 propagan a, _ successful in arousing 
suspicion and doubt amo~~ their collea~ues and the general 
• d' +:ed th.eir attempts topublic. But, as the fina 1 vot e in lcav -. ­
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plant skepticism in the public mind failed. 
VI. 'rIE POOH HIs'rORICAL RECORD OF 
IN'Il~tlNA:rIONAL E.X:PERI~JENTS 
A few opponents sought to corroborate their prophesies 
of doom for the Charter by pointing to past failures at 
similar attempts to bUild peace throUgh collective security 
arrangements. They argued th~t history showed that all such 
ventures had been short-lived and had failed utterly to 
remove the causes of war. 
Senator Shipstead noted that numerous past arrange­
ments had been made to do away with war, but that such 
arrangements had always been ineffective because they were 
attempts by the strong nations, usually victors of a recent 
;,rar. to impose their t"illl on defeated nations. He said that 
the Uni ted Nations peace arrangements v.lere lIst!ll in the 
ltJOmb of secret conclaves of power politics of the three 
I great powers." He also suggested that the failure of the 
Lea'Sue of Nations had been ilpropagandized ll as the fault of 
the United states for refusing to enter, while in reality it 
should be attributed to the unscrupulous terms of the 
\fer.sailles Treaty and to the League's inability to recti 
those terms. In addition, he believed that the selfish 
schemes of victorious powers had negated the possibility of 
1 bid. f 79th Con~ress, 116. 
-
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creating honorable and just international organizations in 
the past, and he predicted that the same would be true of 
1 
any future attempts such as the United Nations. 
Senator Taft for his part agreed with Shipstead that 
past collective security experiments presented a gloomy 
prospect for the United Nat ions. He stated that "Time and 
time international arrangements have been made to assure 
peace and have failed in their purpose. ,,2 He insisted 
further that an international organization Was not the true 
key to peace. The maintenance of peace, he felt was ulti­
mately dependent upon the Wisdom of the leaders of the 
\florId. 3 
A close examination of the debate reveals that there 
were really only a few references to past failures of inter­
national peace-keeping organizations. There appear to have 
been several reasons for this. In the first place, the 
League was the first true attempt to organize nations on a 
worldWide basis for political reaSons. Therefore, the oppo­
nents could not point to any other failure of a comparable 
nature. Of course, there had been numerous alliances and 
attempts at r ional cooperation t'IThich had gone amiss, but 
the Lea;;r,ue l'ITaS the only genuine international precursor of 
the Unlted Nations. Furthermore, the opponents were fully 
1 
J cl. 
;c;i-'.---------------- _2
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aware that the League had become pedestalized as a hallowed 
martyr symbol and that it Was not politically expedient to 
point now to its failure. It was held by a majority of the 
Senate and by the general public that the League had been a 
noble effort that had failed largely because of our non­
membership. Thus, the opponents realized that they could 
not build a forceful counter-argument by evoking feeli~~s of 
guilt about a t"1orthy dream unrealized. 
VII. PHOBABlli ADVERSf~ FUTURE DEVELOPlilENTS 
The last argument used by the opponents related to 
the probable future course of world events. It was confl­
dently predicted by the opponents that the postwar era would 
be a cycle of crises that t<7ould render the United Hations 
useless and Ultimately lead to its destruction. From this 
gloomy prediction they never wandered. 
Senator Hiley, ~'lho saw the Charter as a "las t hope,lf 
was nevertheless skeptical of its Viability. He showed a 
great deal of prophetic ability. in fact, in 11stin~ those 
events Which he felt would pose major obstacles to the suc­
cess of the United Nat ions. First, he said that the Ballm!'1 
Situation. with 1\1arshal Tita as the spearhead of the Fan­
:jlav movement, 1"ould threaten the seeuri ty of sou thern 
L,urope. ,:;eoo1'1d. forecas~ t~<_ath t PUSSl' c<piS demands on Tur]\:eyhe _1 
l ~· that area'sfor control of the Dardenelles \<Tond1 resu v In , c 
~1~lri~rrl. heli foresaw ominous erc end nn; a tr on b1 e s po t~. ~ J _ 
100 
disputes between Russia and China over Mongolia and 
Manchuria. Fourth, he feared that the partition of Germany 
after the War would present an explosive situation. And 
fifth, he feared that the freeing of Korea and other 
1Japanese colonies would cause trouble at some later date. 
~I[iley pointed out that the Charter was "merely a collection 
of 10,000 t'Jords." He said also that it was no more than a 
Jlscrap of paper, fI and that it possessed no more actual value 
than the signatory nations attached to it. He feared that, 
as happened with the League Covenant, world crises would 
cause nations to disregard the principles of the Charter and 
. 1" 2eventua11_y an interneclne war wou Q ensue. 
Senator Shipstead was certain that a confrontation 
with the Soviet Union vIaS inevitable. He predicted that the 
United ions would serve as an appeaser of the U.S.S.R. 
and encourase her to behave aggressively. He also stated: 
e cannot N"in security or peace or liberty for OUT­
sehres and others by casting peoples and principles 
e1 ther dmm the rat hole of appeasement Jr. e., the 
Unit Nation® •.•• If standing for prin~iples 
means war, we had better face it now•.• • J 
Shlpstead felt that a et tough ll policy l;7B,S the only effec­
tive :neans of resistil1f:s Soviet
-
attempts to impose dominion
-
OU,"r t 1 ", v ViQUl' "h"'d ta1"p!,:! of Europe. Be even believed that!':!.v_ (1", "'l,.·~ .0.t, ~_ v~~ 
coming increasingly socialistic. would':n..il; land, l'Jhi oh was 
21 I 
J ..'l··. ' J122e
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eventually line up with the Soviet Union 8.tQ;ainst the United 
1 
states. And he insisted that these probable developments 
made the concept of a United Nations nothing more than an 
ethereal dream that defied the realities of power politics. 
\ 
Senator Bridges, a Charter proponent. was also 
alarmed by the state of the Tfiorld, and especially by condi­
tions in Surope. He was sure that it presented the United 
Nations with an almost insurmountable obstacle. Likewise. 
he bemoaned the fact that the United states was no longer 
2
exerting "r ie;hteou8 might. \I 
Altholligh the term "Cold \flar u t'Jas yet to be coined, a 
study of the opponents' arguments reveals a strong suspicion 
on their part that disunity among the great powers was an 
ineVitable trend that would seriously hinder the effective­
ness of the fledgling United Nations. Germany and Japan 
were on the brink of defeat, and there was little fear of a 
new fascist threat amon~ the senators. Instead, emphasis 
Has placed on potential Soviet aggression. hany Charter 
proponents ap;reed vIi th the opponents on this matter, and 
thUD revealed an ideolor-~ical ambivalence regarding the 
United I'lations. Senator ,~astlancl best illustrated this 
t 'r1ot he would avidly support theambivalence when he said = 
Unt teel tions provided the President did not I1permit Com­
rnuniEPTI S\'ieeD , If ),.,-1'e ~L)elieved that the C()m'TIun~to over ,~urope. . 
2 
Ih' ­ I b~_(?: e , 1 D e1,,: ~ (1 •• 12J. 
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ists were spreading the very things that the United States 
1
had just fought a 1tfar to exterminate. The fact that 
senators such as Eastland foresaw the intensification of a 
flFree '4orld-Communist World" split and advocated a firm 
United states policy to frustrate the new enemy's alleged 
designs was hardly consistent with their optimism concerning 
the United Nations as a road to peace and harmony. As 
Senator Wheeler had said, perhaps the proponents really were 
21I1A1histling in the dark." 
The somber picture of probable future developments 
that was painted by the Charter's opponents was a construc­
tive part of the debate. This was so, for it influenced the 
proponents to relate their idealism to the realities of the 
postwar era and to reflect on the manner in which the United 
States Nould handle crt tical .'!orld problems once the United 
Nations was set up. The opponent's skepticism helped also 
to temper the tendency of many senators to oversell the 
Uni ted Nations as a promoter of peace, and to become Utopian 
about its prospects. 3ut, of course, this in no way negates 
the jucL.;-;ment of history that most of the opponents I argu­
ments were overdrawn and at least a few of them verged on 
paranoia. The fJconsDiracy argument II ~,rould be the best 
example the latter. 
1 T.~ , ,. 
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CHAPTEH. V 
CONCLUSION 
The ultimate significance of the Senate debate, as 
suggested earlier, must be measured in terms of its symbolic 
importance and its degree of realism in predicting the 
future course of the United Nations. In other words, how 
well have the pro and con arguments stood up over the past 
quarter of a century? Did the proponents oversell the UN as 
a peace-keeping agency or were their arguments valid in the 
light of sUbsequent history? Did the opponents perceive the 
Genu! ne problems such a body as the United Nat ions 1!loUld_ 
face when actually established, or were they tilti~5 at 
1AJindmills--maldn_Fi; predictions that never remotely came true? 
And.• f1 nally, to Nhat extent, if any, d1d the echoes of that 
debate help to contri bute indirectly to the current 1,ride­
spread skepticism about the Viability and relevance of the 
Un:l ted IJations':' 
ONAL ACTI 
It has been said that the question of ratification 
was one of the most profound arui complex issues eveT to come 
Co~plexitYt it was ratified a vote of ei~hty-nine to two 
after only six days of debate. 
~t!."S_----------- _ 
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was often deserted and quorum calls were frequently invoked. 
In fact, at one time only ten senators were on hand. l Why, 
it may be asked, did the Senate break the League precedent 
and handle a question of such importance "(1ith such dispatch 
and near unanimous accord? This question can only be ade­
quately answered IrJhen the debate is examined wi thin the con­
text of the mid-forties, and when seen as a part of the 
general post-World War II settlement. 
An interesting popular account of the six-day pro­
ceediW5 S was given by Time Magazine shortly after the final
- ' 
vote had been taJ{en. The article, entitled "History in 
Anti-Climax," stated that throngs of people. many in uni­
form. pushed into the Senate gallaries hoping to hear a 
historic debate. 'rhere Has none, h01'ieVer, because, as the 
f:l,rticle put it, lithe issue had already been settled." The 
article went on to state that the only sig;nificant anger or 
bltter1'1ess was shown by Senator Wheeler durir~ h1s querulous 
three= hour 0J<"Yj'''''e,'c!l as)"""~,_:>c..4.l'__~ Yls··t the. basic Dremises_" of the'--' ' Charter.~. 
Accordi n>"5 to 1'1 me, t he only real point of controversy can­
cer t iole It J and l';hether the Senate or both houses 
S!joul,j authorize !Jniteri States troop commitrnents to the net'; 
OI"caniz ':It ion. Tn; s issue \'las eventually s ett Fres i <iel1t 
1'1 of trooD 
>Tlctory Clouded Only l,y nts,
) f ,S1"'J ee J{. ( Au',:us t 1 ~ 
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commitments would be sUbmitted to the Congress as a whole 
1 
for its consideration. The mood of the Senate as the final 
vote was taken was described as follows: 
When the vote came, it was an anti-climax. Only 
North Dakota's lone-wolf William Langer and Minnesota's 
tall, grey Henrik Shipstead voted against it. The 
ayes: 35 Republicans, 53 Democrats and one Progres­
sive. For a historic step there was no cheering, no 
demonstration. The gallery crowd went aWay qUietly.2 
The eVident lack of enthusiasm or of real controversy 
surprised many observers. Newsweek Magazine, taking note of 
this, pointed out that the phenomenal harmony evidenced on 
the Senate floor ought not to be misconstrued: There was 
strong eVidence that some of the silent, reluctant sup­
porters were already gathering forces to emasculate the 
Charter jqhen implementing legislation came up before the 
Senate in the near future. Senator Wheeler, in fact, pro­
mlsed future trOUble by declaring that Charter approval was 
Ilonly a blind for the real fight ahead."] 
~;[hen all the circumstances surrounding the Senate 
debate are fully conSidered, the near-unanimous vote in sup­
port of the Charter is not too surprisi~~. The Charter had 
received prestigious publicity as the only remaining hope 
l"History in Anti-Climax. n Time. XLVI (August 6. 
194 5), 2]. 
?
-Ibid. 
3'1 Charter I s Victory Clouded Only by Hints of Rear­
guard Attacks, II lac •.cit. 
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for world peace, and, indeed, had become the symbol of a 
glorious tomorrow throughout America. The Senate was thus 
sharply attuned to the public consensus regarding the 
Charter's merits. Senator Connally was quick to remind the 
senators during the early stages of the debate that a Gallup 
Poll conducted on JUly 22 found the public in favor of rati­
1fication by a ratio of twenty to one. Also, it should be 
noted that the concept of a new international peace-keeping 
agency had been introduced to the public gradually and dis­
creetly by President Roosevelt over a period of years. 
Moreover, every effort was made to keep all pre-debate pro­
ceedings open, With a public hearing being held to give 
members of the public an opportunity to air their Views. 
Equally significant, Presidents Roosevelt and Truman 
stressed the necessity of making all preliminary steps 
bipartisan in nature, thus divorcing the question from 
partisan politics. 
Those critics who anticipated a drama similar to that 
Which had surrounded the League debate overlooked all of 
these factors. ~very precaution had been taken in advance 
to aVoid the pitfalls which had defeated the League. As is 
well known. the League had nO real international precedent. 
its pre-debate proceedings were shrouded in secrecy. and 
lU. s.. Congres sional Heoord, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(19lj'5)' IKe, Part 6, 7951. 
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President Wilson had beforehand alienated the RepUblican 
Party. Not least important, the League opponents could 
proudly boast of their isolationist principles without fear 
of reprisal at the polls.l Such was clearly not the case in 
II.	 EVALUATION OF THE DEBATE AND yorE IN TIlli 
LIGHT OF HISTORY 
A superficial examination of the debate, with primary 
emphasis on the almost unanimous endorsement of the Charter, 
might suggest that the Senate oversold the Charter. How­
ever, a careful analysis of the Senate debate within the 
context of the times reveals a sUbstantial degree of realism 
and foresight intermingled within the idealistic rhetoric. 
It, therefore, becomes necessary and meaningful to consider 
some of the predictions and reservations of the senators in 
the light of recent history. 
It must be stressed that very few senators made 
unequivocal statements to the effect th.at the Charter was 
absolutely destined to succeed. While the debate contained 
a copious amount of emotional and idealistic predictions, 
almost all such utterances were qualified with the word 
II hope • II In other words, the senators did not p0rtray the 
lllCharterls Victory Clouded Only by Hints of H.ear~ 
,'?;uard Attacks, II loco cit. 
108 
Charter as a panacea for all the world's ills, but instead 
presented it as an opportunity--an instrument which, if used 
and respected by the countries of the world, would help to 
remove or modify some of the preVious causes of war. The 
Charter was "oversold ll by the Senate only to the extent that 
the Senate put abnormally high expectations on it. The 
often made charge that the Senate oversold the Charter to 
the general public is no more valid than the counterargument 
that the publiC oversold the Charter to the Senate, for a 
Gallup Poll conducted shortly before the debate showed that 
between 80 and 90 per cent of the public definitely favored 
the Charter. Only 30 per cent, however, believed that it 
I 
would actually prevent war. Both the Senate and the public 
were thus pitting hope against historical reality, and 
beneath their hope lay residual doubts and suspicion. The 
Senate was in a real sense a mirror of the voting public 
and, as was to have been expected. the majority of senators 
were inhibited about expressing too bluntly their doubts and 
apprehensions concerning the Charter. They doubtless feared 
reprisal at the polls. consequently, the term "debate" was 
largely a misnomer, for the majority of business on the 
floor was little more than a succession of emotionally pre­
pared speeches. Yet, beneath the surface of the set 
speeches, there did exist evidence of understandin~, percep­
lcon~resslonal Record. 2£. cit •• 8183. 
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tion, and a certain prescience. 
Considering some key questions is one way of relating 
the senatorial debate to the evolution of the United lmtions 
as a peace-keeping agency. What role. for example, has the 
United Nations played in preserving the peace? What prob­
lems have arisen that were seen or unforseen by the senators? 
And What methods has the United Nations employed to meet 
these problems? 
Norman Padelford and George Lincoln have stated that 
the United Nations Was overwhelmingly endorsed by the Senate 
primarily because it Was hoped by most of the senators that 
the great powers would continue to cooperate as they had 
done during the War. This was clearly the chief basis for 
their optimism. In talking about the se~~tors' View of the 
United Nations as a peace-keepi~~ agency, these authors 
wrote: 
The functions of the new organization and the 
responsibilities accepted by its members repre­
sented the practital limits of formalized collabora­
tion at the time. 
As has been shown. the bulk of the debate centered upon the 
Security Council and its function in keeping the peace 
INorman Padelford and GeorgeLincoln, The Dynamic*?~ 
International Politics (New Yorl{: Nacmillan comp~p.y,~9~( , 
4 ". . , I' "'1' Iherg'er UN- The r'irstP.7'.1; see also C~ark l'j. ,.:. cne l.__ , -+; :-r is. Arthur 
fifteen Years (New York: Harper and Brotn~rs, . ~ ~) 'Tho 
~ox. Fr~sEects for FeaCe~{eerlng (;1ashington, D. G.. - ~ 
droo]{ings Institution, 1967. 
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through collective security and the great power veto. And, 
as a broad generalization, it may be said that the Senate 
finally concluded that the Council would be entrusted with 
handling serious questions of peace and security and would 
have access to collective force against an aggressor, but 
only as a last resort. 
Most of the senators, as indicated earlier, felt that 
the veto privilege would serve as a II safety valve ll in pre­
venting collective action against a great power. For the 
Senate certainly did not intend for the collective peace 
force to infringe upon the sovereign power of the United 
states. Hence, it was emphasized that only a limited com­
mitment of troops and resources would be made available to 
the United Nations With, of course, the approval of COngress. 
The rna jori ty of senators clearly believed that the 
concept of a collective peace force under the auspices of 
the Security Council had a good chance of success for 
several reasons. First, and foremost, it was assumed that 
no action would be taken unless a unanimous consensus was 
reaChed amo~~ the five great powers. And second, it was 
reasoned that the threat of collective action by most of the 
nations of the world would exert tremendous moral as well as 
a tO".·.g· ressor,roi 1 ltary pressure on any NOU ld- b e ~ _ thereb,r servingJ 
as an effective deterrent. 
Most senators were qUick to qualify their optimism 
n~e~ents in worldabout the role of collective security l?J'ra -0 ..•~ c" - ­
III 
peace by stating ultimate effectiveness was contingent on 
several key factors. First, it Was imperative that the 
great powers possess a sincere interest in preserving the 
peace through consensual cooperation. In other words, a 
prerequisite was that the world must not become divided into 
factional power camps, with each camp seeking to expand its 
power and influence at the expense of peace and security, 
and the veto should not be used to shield aggression. Num­
erous senators perceived that a rift Was already developing 
between Russia and the United States, and they expressed 
apprehension and skepticism about the workings of the 
Security Council if such a situation should further develop. 
While the proponents underplayed this possibility, they were 
nevertheless aware of it. And the opponents based their 
prophesies of doom largely on the simple fact that Soviet 
IIduplici tyll would inevitably make the Security CoUncil use­
less. Opponents likewise argued that the existing great 
power unity was merely a temporary thing which would be 
shattered after the War was over. 
An examination of postwar efforts at collective 
action would appear to justify the 1945 skeptics and Charter 
opponents. Today, the concept of collective military action 
is all but dead. This does not mean, however, that the pro-
II . i· th irponents favorinn; that were totally naive or Utopian _n e __ 
arguments. It instead means that, While the concept tvEiS in 
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theory sound, it failed in practice because of unforeseen 
developments such as the Cold War. 
'rhe theory's major premise was that the great powers 
in the postwar would remain united in their common concern 
for peace and would sacrifice a certain amount of selfish 
interest towards the goal of world peace. But, of course. 
the development of the Cold War, with the United States and 
Russia assuming the status of polarized superpowers. effec­
tively killed this vision of collective security. These two 
superpowers increasingly measured all threats to security in 
terms of a narrow self-interest, and tended to assume a 
paranoid stance toward each other. Very soon after the War, 
the United States gained the support of most of the West and 
relegated Russia to the position of "lone wolf" on the 
Security Council. This polarization was perhaps not unjusti­
fied at the time, when one considers the apparent expansion­
ist policies of Stalin's SOViet Union, but it nevertheless 
caused the demise of the concept of collective security. 
Inis Claude has shown that the concept of lftotal" 
collective security tiles destroyed by the Cold ~lar for several 
b d the assumptionreasons. First. the concept was ase upon 
that the t'lorld \'lould be basically united in its indictment 
of an aggressor. It was assumed that a case of aggression 
· culpability Nould bewould be blacl{ and wh1 te. and hence the ­
\u:----~------------­
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1clearly traceable to a single blatant source. Postwar con­
flicts have shown (e.g., Middle East in 1956 and the Arab­
Israeli conflict today) that this is often not the case and 
that a consensus cannot be reached as to exactly who the 
aggressor ls. Furthermore. as some senators in 1945 pre­
dicted, even when an aggressor nation is obvious and 
identifiable. there has been no means of unifying the rest 
of the world against such a state because the world has been 
so sharply split into opposing factions and no nation has 
given its first allegiance to the United Nations. The prob­
lem is further complicated by the fact that since World 
War II the alleged aggressor in world politics has been the 
Soviet Union, and thus great power unity on the Security 
Council has been circumvented by the veto (e.g., Hungary in 
1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, or, as some might argue, South 
Vietnam and the United states since 1964). 
Claude's second assumption about massive collective 
security is that there should be enough diffusion of power 
to enable collective action to be effectively taken against 
2 
any single nation in the \q-orld. But, as has been iOO1­
lInt s L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares (Ne~
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cated, the emergence after the War of the United States. 
and 
the Soviet Union as the two rival Superpowers in possession 
of the preponderance of world military power immediately 
nullified that condition. It remains to this day largely an 
unfulfilled condition. 
Claude's third basic requirement for effective col­
lective security is that the United Nations be ready to back 
1up the threat of force with action if necessary. However, 
-with so much power concentrated in the United States and the 
U.S.S.R., and With these two nations possessing the veto, it 
soon became apparent that collective military action Simply 
could not be launched against either of these giants. 
Therefore, as the Cold \I]'ar evolved, it became eVident to the 
nations of the world that the United Nations did not in fact 
possess a true "collective foree ll capable of defeating a 
determined aggressor. Furthermore, with the world ever more 
spIt t into two "camps, II it l'ias obvious that either the 
United States or Russia would probably apply the veto in 
support of an aggressor it favored. 
In the debate, most senators stopped short of advo­
cat1~~ that collective security should enlist a massive 
international force capable of defeating a given nation. 
They merely envisioned a limited force that would put out 
"brush fires" before the,y could become major conflicts. 
1 
•• p. !~31. 
..------------------------.II!a!lJII""II-,,<c!l,-;,~II,!i 
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They also assumed that such "brush fires" would involve only 
small nations, and they argued that collective security 
tools could deal only with such minor conflicts. Therefore, 
as a "backup" to collective security, they emphasized the 
importance of bUilding a massive domestic army and navy to 
ensure peace, and they strongly favored the regional inter­
vention by American and Latin American forces rather than by 
an international force. 
With one exception, postwar developments seem to have 
upheld the reasoning of those senators who only advocated 
"limited" collective security that would apply to conflicts 
between smaller nations. The exception was the Korean War. 
In this instance, of course, the term "collective security" 
is something of a misnomer, for the war was basically a 
United States-financed and United States-directed campaign. 
In fact, the war would not have had United Nations endorse­
ment if the Soviet Union had been present and voting at the 
Security Council meeting when the co~mitment of UN forces 
Was made. But at least the war did bear the United Nations 
imprimatur. 
The Korean War showed that it was neither practicable 
nor prudent for the United Nations to enter a serious con­
flict involving a superpower, and in this context Secretary­
General Da,g; Hammarskjold ori£?;inated the term Ilpreventive 
diplomacy. II s approacl1, SOUg.1! t t 0 e,xcl'lde the-- rna <, 10r 
"ers' from involvement inpowers. especially the ttl')'O superpo~·. • ".L 
·~---------------------""1I2.1l,1!"~g•.!!! 
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any conflict resolution and hoped instead to utilize the 
services of the smaller uncommitted nations. Hammarskjold 
realized that many of the existing world tensions were the 
resul t of a "power vacuum, II and he believed that if he could 
keep the big antagonists separated from each other he might 
succeed in discouraging a potentially explosive situation. 
He sought also to localize conflicts and, if necessary, fill 
the power vacuum with a force of troops from small neutral 
1
states. 
It would seem that Hammarskjold's preventive diplomacy 
approach, which was in reality a modified form of collective 
security (an "impartial police force n ), was quite compatible 
with the 1945 Senate's conception of collective security. 
It should be pointed out, however, that no senator during 
the entire debate advocated an international police force 
Wholly devoid of great power troops. In other words, While 
senators saw the necessity of 11mitin~ collective action to 
"polici!\,?;11 activi ties involVing mainly the smaller nations, 
none had the foresight to argue against United States (or 
any other great power) troop obligations as a way of 
separati looal conflicts from great power interests. 
Preventive diplomacy was employed several times by 
I-Ltlmmarskjold. b inning with the IVJiddle East in 1956 and 
l Qh(\ ·r"'''''le Cono:.o situationen·di r1J;;; W1t h the Conr." 0 cr issi i n· /' v V • 11 ~. 
1 I
.
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eventually more or less directly involved both the United 
States and Russia. and it ended in such a polarized atmos­
phere that collective security through the United Nations 
appears to be fairly moribund today. Such a development was 
not foreseen in 194 5. 
As was shown earlier. another strong point advanced 
by the Senate was the creative role of the Security Council 
and the International Court of Justice in promoting peace by 
pacific settlement of disputes. In this respect, the propo­
nents' predictions were valid to an extent. Post-1945 
history has demonstrated that when a genuine dispute rss 
arisen, as opposed to intentional hostile aggression by one 
party, the Security Council has been relatively successful 
in "clearin",: the air. tI To be sure, many of the senators 
supportln~ the Charter predicted that pacific settlement 
would operate much more smoothly and methodically than ~as 
so far been the case. The conciliation-mediation-arbitra­
tion formula which was seen as a logical, orderly solution 
to solvi~s a dispute has never been invoked in a strict 
step-by-step fashion with a "decision" being: handed dot'ln to 
t·-.ht>-~ comp1 e·t e sa t•• .Ls.4 f BC·ti· on. 0 f h,,0..._th part 1e'"o. There are doubt­
less several reasons for this. A major reason certainly is 
that pacific settlement 1s based on the va~arles of volun­
teerlsm instead of compulsion. The council has found that 
parties toit 1s simply impossible to com081 um\Tllli 
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appear before it and accept its decision. Furthermore, 
experience has shown that only the party which feels that it 
is at a disadvantage in a dispute is most likely to seek 
recourse through the Council. Finally, the United Nations 
has generally been unable to back up pacific settlement with 
firm collective action. Still, despite all these problems, 
the Council has been effective at least in bringing pressure 
on the disputants to end hostilities and reach some kind of 
accord or compormise. In a broad sense, therefore, the 
Senate's contention in 1945 that persuasion and conciliation 
would be the primary tools used by the Council to maintain 
peace has so far been validated by events. 
Yet another point promoted by the proponents was the 
prospective role of the United Nations in aidi~~ peace by 
providi~~ for the general social, economic, and humanitarian 
betterment of the world. It was argued that the sociological 
ills of the world were really the root causes of war, and 
they therefore had to be exterminated. The economic and 
SOCial approach to peace, otherWise Im.ot'Jn as the IIfunc­
tiortr::tl" approach, has definitely been a major force in pre­
servi the life of the United Nations. This approach is 
largely divorced from political ideol ies a~d seeks to deal 
With problems of universal concern. Thus, the United 
tions has succeeded in obtaini~~ cooperation and consensuS 
ined s nificantin this area, and the member st,ates have 
understandin,,\ of one another t<!hile bein/d: erv':a.:::ed in Joint 
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functional endeavors. 
Certainly one of the prime moving forces behind the 
United Nations today is the General Assembly. Since the 
U.S. Senate largely neglected to discuss the role of this 
body in the future work of the United Nations, it is 
impossible to assess the 1945 senators· perception in this 
respect. Some senators did make casual reference to the 
General Assembly, usually describing it in some such 
idealistic terms as the lItown meeting of the world." One 
thing seems obvious: No Senator foresaw the massive influx 
of new nations. mostly former colonies. which would com­
p1etely change the complexion of the Assembly from that of a 
"Hestern" body to that of a truly international one. The 
majority of senators appeared to envision the General 
Assembly as a basically placid and harmonious body consist­
ing of Western Suropean nations and then Latin American 
allies. Yet, despite the fact that the General Assembly has 
more than doubled its size since the inception of the United 
Nations and has drifted away from its previous pro-United 
States orientation, it has lar~ely fulfilled the basic 
objectives foreseen by the Senate. It has, in fact, served 
~ 1 ""',.,.a·r1.ret. p_la.cell of	 ideas and, throughas an lnternationa u, h 
free debate, has enabled the nations of the world to express 
their views on a~y conceivable	 SUbject. 
ts.. jre.n. ..Dlace since 1945 which,Quite a events have '- ­
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of course, could not have been anticipated by the Senate. 
Several times during the 1960's, for example, the eXistence 
of the United Nations Was seriously threatened. Thus, in 
the early sixties there was the Russian proposal for a 
"troika" to replace the Security CounciL Then there was 
the Congo Crisis and the ensuing Russian threats of defec­
tion. Disenchantment in the United states has grown with 
the inability of the United Nations to "solve" such inter­
national conflicts as the Pakistani-Indian dispute, the 
Arab-Isreali dispute, and even Vietnam. Many Americans have 
also expressed disfavor t'ITi th the growing coalition of Afro-
Asian nations and their frequent vilification of United 
states policy. other serious problems have included the 
dispute over payment of arrears, the question of membership 
for Hed China, and the proposal to give less than full 
status to the mini-states. 
The realities of power politics have, thus, prevented 
the United Nations from realizing many of the goals and 
aspirations hoped for by its proponents, but, it 1s still 
very rnuch alive and there has yet to be a l40rld (var III. It 
is exceedingly difficult to secare an objective appraisal of 
the success of the United Nations in preventin.g war, for 
while it. ic.~ Il'st those wars which have occurred 
'J 89.Sy to 
'.1 _tt i~ l'ffi.Posslble to list those which maySInce ~orld ~ar II, I 0 . 
Hence, it ishave been prevented by United ilJations action. 
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difficult to refute those skeptics who contend that the 
United Nations has served no useful purpose and is really 
dominated by Anti-American elements bent on our destruction. 
In retrospect, it appears that the Senate did, 
indeed, oversell the Charter to a degree. The overwhelming 
vote of endorsement, the brief SiX-day debate, and the pro­
fusion of optimistic forecasts projected an image of over­
riding confidence on the part of the Senate that the United 
Nations would truly serve as a major instrument of world 
peace. Today, it is alleged by some that unreasonable 
expectations were aroused by the Charter debate which have 
resulted in much of the disillusionment and criticism that 
now exist. As Senator Fulbright said at the time of the 
debate: ItI have the feeling, lvrr-. President, that perhaps 
the Charter has been oversold, both to the public and to the 
1Senate. II Senator Alexander Smith (H., N.J.) agreed with 
Fulbright and warned that 
The principal danger in looking at the resu~ts
 
attained at San Francisco is in the assumptlon
 
that some final, grandiose, overall plan for
 
preservirp: the ueace of the t'forla must come out
 ~ ·~o ~ ? 
of this conference.~ 
Senator F!'ancis Nyers (D., renn.) ';>las also dismayed by the 
lack of in-depth debate over the Charter. He argued that 
1 1 < or,4 '"'r< 9th COl1¢'.. 1st Sess.U • .3 .. ConF~ressiona HeCLl, 
(19Lj,S), V;:C, Part' (), 79b2. 
« 
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"Half-hearted support for this Charter from SOUrces with 
unspoken reservations is more a menace to its sUccess than 
their outright OPPosition.,,1 
It is doubtful, however, that the enthusiastic bless­
ings bestowed upon the Charter by the Senate can be more 
than remotely linked to the disilluslon~ent now in vogue. 
As has been emphasized throughout this stUdy, the Senate's 
quick handling of the question and the final vote were 
accurate reflections of the pUblic sentiment at the time. 
Had the senators deliberated longer on the Charter ann 
passed it by a narrow margin, it might be argued that the 
public expectati ons about the future would have been modified 
accord1rl,7,ly. It is the author f s opinion, however. that 
those Nho are presently inclined to attack the Charter '[Ilould 
do so in any case, regardless of the kind of picture painted 
by the Senate over tHenty-five years ago. Inis Claude has 
said that many of the disenchanted Charter critics choose to 
remain that Nay because they refuse to place the United 
Nations in a realistic perspective. These critics, accord­
ing to ClaUde, are idealistic supporters of the United 
Nations, but believe that it is merely a step towards world 
peace throue;h the transcendinJ~ of the nation-state system in 
the direction of a system of international IaN" and. brother­
123 
hood. Such idealistic critics, he says, ignore the value of 
the United Nations as a means of making the present nation­
1
state system work more effectively. It is likewise the 
author 's viel'J' that today's disenchantment 1s not really due 
to the Charter I s having been "oversold" by the Senate in 
1945, but is due largely, as Claude says, to the inability 
of many fu~ericans to accept the fact that the United Nations 
must operate "within the context of the multistate system," 
since "the sovereign state Q.s] the basic entity of world 
political life•••• ,,2 
Furthermore, the Senate never promised the general 
public that the United Nations would evolve into an inter­
national cure-all for the world's problems. As pointed out 
earlier in this chapter, beneath the superficial air of 
optimism and hard-sell tactics displayed by the majority of 
the Charter's proponents, there eXisted much eVidence of 
realism and objectivity. Thus, the senators did not promise 
that the United Nations \'fould definitely succeed in accom­
plishing peace, they merely stressed that it would aspire to 
maintain peace. As has been shown. qUite a few senators 
brought out potential weaknesses within the Charter and 
alluded to world conditions that could jeopardize its 
chances of success. Unfortunately, however, the spirit of 
Ol.J. p. 8.1
-Claude. ~)words 1nto. PloNshares.• ....... cit.,
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the times compelled the majority of senators to underplay 
these potential weaknesses while expounding at length on the 
virtues of the Charter. In short, the practical was not 
sufficiently intermingled With the idealistic in a consis­
tently realistic fashion. 
It does not appear that the opponents' prophesies of 
doom regarding the Charter were based on deep perception or 
special insight: such prophesies were, in fact, largely 
based on paranoid isolationism. The crux of their prophecies 
was that United States membership in the United Nations 
would undermine our national sovereignty, sap our resources, 
expose us to the mercy of domestic and foreign subversion, 
and, ultimately involve us in a third world war. None of 
these dire forecasts has as yet come to pass. 
Nonetheless, the opponents' dialogue was an invalu­
able contribution to the debate, for it served to temper the 
prevallin~ optimism of the proponents, forcing them to pause 
and reflect on the possible infirmities of the organization. 
l'loreover, although their suspicions regarding the role of 
, 
the United Nations Vis-~-vls the United States were unfounded 
and thus invalid, many of their predictions concerning the 
decay of the wartime alliance and the ensuing problems of 
the postwar era were essentially accurate. Senators hqr~er. 
3hipstea(i.iJh.eeler, and i3ushfield (the latter hJO voted for 
t ne ' ter. continua11 .G"~ ed ·"'6 arf1"1F~ent8n"'~'atiiTebut ~Y Od er. - '0"" 
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advent of the cold war and the negative effects it would 
he~e on the workings of the Security Council. In addition. 
their contention that selfish nationalism and mistrust among 
nations would prevent the United Nations from implementing 
effective peace-keeping operations has Come true to a lar~e 
o 
extent. 
A significant core of senators. best described as 
11semi-opponents ll or IIreluctant supporters." also played an 
important role in the debate. These senators supported the 
basic goals and objectii.res of the Charter. but frequently 
expressed reservations about its specific provisions and 
also revealed doubt as to the prospects of the United 
Nations ever attaini~~ the goals espoused by the Charter. 
Prominent among these senators were Warren Austin (R., Vt.), 
Owen Brevister (H •• fle.). Styles Bridges (H' t N.H.). C. l'lay­
land 3rool{s (H.• , Ill.), Homer Gapehard (R.., Ind.). Arthur 
Capper (H., Kans.), GUy Corydon (H., Ore.), J. lfIilliam Fu1­
b ' Jt (~\1) •• r') l'Del' t"tJ.aNKes' (<->ri., T\~ T) , '"'::;'uO'enec,·· llikin1'15.1. ArK •• A. "'.v. 
(H. f Col.), Francis iVIyers (D., Penn.). Leverett Saltonstall 
(;1.. ss.), ;.iobert Taft (H •• Ohio). Alexander \'liley (B., 
I 
t-!is.), and Haymond HilliS (H., Ind.). It is interesting to 
... tl1at among t ors, 0 l'r Qu1b1" h_+- a."'1'1.dnave thes e fifteen sena nJ"- ,~ - ~ 
ers were Demoorats. In retrospect it seems that the 
Uemocrats felt a pressi obligation to follow the Drece­
., 1st Sess, 
....--------------_.­
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d.ents established in their ranks by such prestigious individ­
uals as Roosevelt, Truman, Senate Majority Leader Alben 
Barkley, and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee Tom 
Connally. The Republicans, on the other hand, were less 
easily wooed by the solicitations of Minority Leader Arthur 
Vandenberg, and this fact, coupled with their more conserva­
tive inclinations, helped to bring mare realism to the 
debate. 
III. A PH.OSPECTIV8 VIEliJ OF THE DEBATE IN TEE LIGHT OF 
CURRE~~ DISILLUSIONf~NT 
Over twenty-five years have now passed since the 
Senate's debate over ratification of the Charter. Nuch of 
what was said duriThT, that debate is significant and relevant 
today, es cially in the light of the current disl11usion­
ment about the United Nations. What, it may be asked, are 
the primary criticisms of the Charter today, and how do they 
compare with the objections and criticism that were made at 
the time of the debate? 
Today, both idealists and skeptics allege that the 
United ions has failed to cope effectively with the prob­
1em3 of the tl,rues ' .... t:,Ov _ the dreams of its propo­' 0-,- rea,.,11 ze_ 
nents. As leford and Lincoln have said: 
~ . l~ to rt"cc~n,.,'.t· the fact that 
proble'118 . 'ore1~n r ~ i ro a'..",'·"' ....'--qre solv Th ey 
It is I or peaL) e C2 v,.. ." 
f ~in 8_18 _~G 
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are more often worn out or simply replaced by other 
and more difficult problems. l 
On one hand, the Charter is attacked by idealists as being 
weak and ineffectual, and they say it should be discarded in 
favor of a system of world government. 
On the other end of the political spectrum. reaction­
aries charge that the Charter is a diabolical scheme that 
has eroded America's sovereignty and continually threatens 
to en~age this country in another world war. In light of 
such criticisms, what are the future prospects of the 
Charter, and how may these prospects be related to the 1945 
debate? 
As was suggested above, the United Nations has served 
as a fairly effective instrument of peace so far, and it 
will probably continue to do so in the future, with certain 
limitations. It has proven to be an active, near-universal 
organization, and it has afforded the nations of the world a 
co~non meeti~5 ground for their diplomacy. Beyond this, it 
has proven to be useful in several past disputes, such as 
3uez, the Congo, and Cuba. Cecil Crabb pointed out, for 
..• 191'')·example, t~hat durirlco: the Cuban missi 1e crISIS.l.n 0,-, • 
• . • if vJashil1;,,;ton did not lean initially upon the 
United Nations to deal with the threat of communist 
intrusion into the Western Hemisphere, it ~t least 
was williro~ to accept SUbsequent attempts by the 
United Nations to mitigate the crisis and to avert 
The DvnamicS of 
....... k -"'#Z'" 
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a head-on American-Soviet military confrontation. l 
The United Nations has thus survived numerous crises ahd 
seen its way through the height of the East-West split. In 
the meantime, it, has adapted to the unremitting tensions 
between the ~oJestern powers and the "have not" nations of the 
Third World. 
In 1971, the United Nations appears to have survived 
its "grm'1ing pains fl and settled into a period of less 
glamour and excitement under the leadership of Secretary-
General U Thant. Thant seems to believe that the United 
Nations is not the proper organ for settling major differ­
ences which tnvolve the East-West struggle (i.e., the Soviet 
Union and Un! ted States), and he has abandoned the peace­
keepir~ schemes devised by his predecessors, save one-­
"talk. II lJerhaps multilateral talk is the true value of the 
United Nations today, for it means an opportunity for the 
nations of the world, particularly the smaller ones th~t 
cannot afford the channels of unilateral diplomacy, to d18­
cuss world tensions and problems openly and freely as an 
alternative to wagilli~ war. kgain it needs to be stressed 
that the United Nations has served as an a~ent of good will 
by brlnsin~ the nations of the world closer together through 
leecil If. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign I-olicl .!l1 the 
,Nuclear 1\(>:e (second edition; I1ew 'lon: Harper and dOl';. 
19f)5) , p7')J; see also Hosalyn ga:lns, Unite~ Natlon~ 
Peacekeeping 6-1 (London: ()~ford University .?ress, 
IClt')Cl~ .. _ .. _­
/ /). 
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social, economic, and humanitarian endeavors. 
At the time of the debate, the prospects of the 
United Nations certainly were no brighter than they are 
today. In fact, with the approaching cold 1'lar, it 1s 
probable that the promise of that Organization was consid­
erably less in 1945. Because it was a new experiment which 
was a fol101tv-up to a devastating Horld War, hot'iever, it Was 
heralded by many as the only salvation of mankind. 
It is well to recall that the two basic conditions 
which the 1945 senators stressed as prereqUisites for the 
success of the United Nations are still absent today: a 
common consensus among the member states as to the goals and 
objectives of the Organization, and a climate of opinion of 
mutual trust and tolerance. The realities of world politics 
and fanatical nationalism will doubtless always impede the 
realization of such conditions. It was nevertheless believed 
in 1945, as it is today, that feelin~s of trust and mutuality 
amon",?: nations can develop in a 810':'1, evolutionary marL'1er,
'-.-'. ­
and that the Uni ted Nations offers the best vehicle for such 
'1 deve1op'1lent. 
In conclusion, this study has sought to shm-v that the 
. . ti ~ "he "harter \\Tas 1"e1e­8f-~natorial debate over rat:LflCa on or v. v.· 
vant to the future shape and reputation of the United 
t ions. /I..s has bee 1'1 demonstrated, many of the argU'1lents 
1n lo4S are just
and r:l pprehensi ons of f ered by the senat ors --> / ~ 
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as applicable today as they were then. T b 
-- 0 e sure, history 
has bad a soberinl!, effect on the enlYJgelical fervor which 
surrounded the Charter I s adoption in 1945, but the basic 
contentions of the Senate that there was a clear need for an 
international peace-keeping organization and that, until a 
superior alternative was offered, the United Nations must 
serve that need, are still valid. As Senator Arthur Capper 
of Kansas said in 1945: 
No one mal;;:es the claim that it (i;he Chartefl is 
a perfect instrument. Nor does anyone believe that 
a perfect instrument can be devised, making allm.r­
ances for the vagaries of human nature, and the 
chances for misunderstanding among nations and 
people With highly different CUltures, ideologies, 
and forms of government. l 
So it ~J'as that, through its debate, the Senate 
advanced the hope that the Unl ted Nations vJould prove to be 
a Viable mechanism by Which the peoples and nations of the 
h'or 1d 1'Jould substi tu t e the exercise of forbearance and 
reason for military adventurism as the chief means of 
settling disputes behreen nations. That hope is still alive 
and still r;Uldes the United Nations in the international 
arena. 
If the senators bac]{ in 10'/'-1'1'5 d'd1-not	 see everything 
h' " ' 't theythat rfe nO\'Jperceive l>Jith our twenty-twenty, InQSlgn , 
at least foresa\f many of the difficulties and problems that 
'~"8 (lq1J~) 
Y ("<0\")'" c t1 COlv:resn i 01'101 ", 7'"', t'11 v '''Co'' 1's, ::JeQc. '~' jl'tlecora, 
, ' " ?' , rr-'<r - -­'~t Yart (). 7"Ou,. 
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the United Nations would ultimately Confront. And if the 
Senate is to be faulted today. it should perhaps be faulted 
not so much for its high hopes and aspirations as for its 
excessive haste in debating and approving the Charter. But 
even grantiYl.g that. it seems unfair today to blame the 
Senate retrospectively for the skepticism about the United 
Nations that today affects American public opinion. The 
garments of prophecy are no more becoming to United States 
senators than to scholars. 
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